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THE VALUE OF INFORMATIONAL ARBITRAGE
HUY N. CHAU, ANDREA COSSO, AND CLAUDIO FONTANA
Abstract. In the context of a general semimartingale model of a complete market, we aim at
answering the following question: How much is an investor willing to pay for learning some inside
information that allows to achieve arbitrage? If such a value exists, we call it the value of infor-
mational arbitrage. In particular, we are interested in the case where the inside information yields
arbitrage opportunities but not unbounded profits with bounded risk. In the spirit of Amendinger
et al. (2003, Finance Stoch.), we provide a general answer to the above question by relying on
an indifference valuation approach. To this effect, we establish some new results on models with
inside information and study optimal investment-consumption problems in the presence of initial
information and arbitrage, also allowing for the possibility of leveraged positions. We characterize
when the value of informational arbitrage is universal, in the sense that it does not depend on the
preference structure. Our results are illustrated with several explicit examples.
1. Introduction
The notion of information plays a crucial role in the analysis of investment decisions. In line with
economic intuition, access to more precise sources of information gives an informational advantage
leading to better performing portfolios. The problem of quantifying such an informational advan-
tage represents a central question in finance and has constantly attracted significant attention in
financial economics and, more recently, in mathematical finance.
In this work, we develop a general approach for quantifying in monetary terms the informational
advantage associated to some inside information, in the context of a general semimartingale model
of a complete market, under weak assumptions on the random variable (denoted by L) represent-
ing the inside information. We adopt an indifference valuation approach, determining a value pi(v)
which makes a risk averse agent with initial capital v indifferent between the following two alterna-
tives: (i) invest optimally the initial capital v by relying on the publicly available information only;
(ii) acquire the inside information L at the price pi(v) and invest optimally the residual capital
v − pi(v) by relying on the publicly available information enriched by the inside information.
The idea of quantifying information through an indifference valuation approach can be traced
back to early contributions in information economics, see in particular [LV68, MR72, Mor74, Wil89].
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The same approach has been pursued in the context of modern mathematical finance in [ABS03],
which represents the main starting point for the present work. An alternative approach for the
measurement of the value of information consists in computing the utility gain of an informed
agent, as considered for instance in [PK96, AIS98, Hil05, ADI06, HJ17]. However, this has the
drawback of expressing the value of information in utility terms, and not in monetary units.
A distinguishing feature of the present work is that we explicitly allow the inside information L to
generate arbitrage opportunities for an informed agent. This situation is not covered by the existing
literature, except for the extreme case where the knowledge of L is so informative that it leads to
infinite utility for an informed agent (see, e.g., [PK96, AIS98]). In contrast, we assume that the
inside information can be exploited to realize arbitrage opportunities, but unbounded profits with
bounded risk cannot be achieved (this represents the minimal condition allowing for a meaningful
solution to optimal portfolio problems, see [KK07, CDM15, CCFM17]). In this framework, we call
the indifference value of L the value of informational arbitrage.
As we are going to show, informational arbitrage arises whenever the inside information reveals
that some events, which are believed to occur with strictly positive probability by public opinion,
are actually impossible. In order to illustrate the notion of the value of informational arbitrage,
let us present a simple example, which will be analysed in a more general version in Section 5.1.
Example 1.1. Consider a financial market with a single risky asset, with price process
St = exp (Wt − t/2) , for all t ∈ [0, 1],
where (Wt)t∈[0,1] is a standard Brownian motion. The ordinary information (publicly available) is
given by the observation of the price process alone, corresponding to the filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,1].
We suppose that the inside information is represented by the observation at t = 0 of the random
variable L = 1{W1≥0}. In other words, an informed agent who observes the realization of L knows
before the beginning of trading whether the terminal value S1 of the asset will be above or below the
threshold 1/
√
e. The information flow available to an informed agent is described by the initially
enlarged filtration G = (Gt)t∈[0,1], where Gt = Ft ∨ σ(L) for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Clearly, the ordinary information does not allow any kind of arbitrage profits and every risk
averse agent would simply choose not to trade in the risky asset S. On the contrary, the inside
information L yields arbitrage opportunities, which can also be realized through suitably chosen
buy-and-hold strategies. In this sense, we say that L yields informational arbitrage and we aim
at determining the indifference value pi(v), namely the maximal amount that an agent with initial
wealth v > 0 accepts to pay for learning the realization of L before the beginning of trading.
In the context of this example, we will show that for any risk averse agent constrained to invest
in non-negative portfolios the value of informational arbitrage is always given by
pi(v) = v/2.
This means that, while it is attractive to acquire the inside information L, a risk averse agent
would not sacrifice more than one half of his initial wealth in order to have the possibility of
achieving arbitrage. Moreover, there exists an arbitrage strategy which represents the optimal
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trading strategy for every risk averse informed agent. Referring to Section 5.1 for a detailed
analysis of this example, we point out that the value pi(v) presents the striking feature of being a
universal indifference value, which does not depend on the preference structure.
In the present work, we aim at revealing which features of the inside information are at the origin
of the appearance of arbitrage and understanding the indifference value of informational arbitrage
in a general setting. Motivated by Example 1.1 and similarly as in [ABS03], the problem is naturally
framed in the context of an initial enlargement of filtration. However, in order to allow for the
possibility of informational arbitrage, we have to depart from the conventional assumption that L
is independent of the ordinary information flow F under an equivalent probability measure (called
decoupling measure in [ABS03]). The notion of decoupling measure goes back to early works in the
theory of enlargement of filtrations and has been widely employed in the insider trading literature
(see, e.g., [GP98, GP01, Ame00, Cam05, Hil05, HJ17]). The existence of a decoupling measure is
tantamount to the equivalence between the F-conditional law of L and its unconditional law and
allows to easily transfer to the initially enlarged filtration G most of the properties of F, including
the (semi-)martingale property, market completeness and, most notably, absence of arbitrage.
We assume the validity of Jacod’s density hypothesis, as introduced in the seminal paper [Jac85].
This condition is significantly weaker than the existence of a decoupling measure, as it corresponds
to the absolute continuity (but not necessarily equivalence) of the F-conditional law of L with
respect to its unconditional law. While the passage from an equivalence to an absolute continuity
relation could appear as a technical generalization, it turns out to require the development of a
novel approach. Most importantly, it allows the inside information to generate arbitrage, as shown
in Example 1.1, thus covering situations that cannot be addressed by the existing works.
The main results and contributions of the paper can be outlined as follows. First, we provide
a new martingale representation result in the initially enlarged filtration G, showing that market
completeness can be transferred from F to G up to a change of nume´raire. By relying on this
result, we obtain a complete characterization of the validity of no free lunch with vanishing risk
(NFLVR, see [DS94, DS98]) and no unbounded profit with bounded risk (NUPBR, see [KK07]) in
G. This set of theoretical results provides the necessary foundations for the study of optimal
consumption-investment problems under inside information and, possibly, in the presence of arbi-
trage opportunities. We consider preferences described by a utility stochastic field together with a
random consumption clock and assume that agents are allowed to enter into leveraged positions, up
to the limit of a fixed credit line. We provide a general solution via duality methods, which reveals
the interplay between arbitrage and leverage and can be made explicit in the case of typical utility
functions. In turn, this enables us to study the indifference value pi(v) of the inside information L.
Under natural assumptions, we prove that pi(v) is finite and also strictly positive and increasing
in the allowable leverage whenever the information revealed by L allows to achieve arbitrage op-
portunities, regardless of the preference structure. For logarithmic and power utility functions, we
obtain explicit expressions for pi(v), thereby generalizing the results of [ABS03] and proving some
of the empirical findings reported in [LPS10]. Moreover, we provide universal bounds for the value
of informational arbitrage and characterize when the indifference value of inside information is a
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universal value which does not depend on the preference structure, as in the case of Example 1.1.
In particular, we show that this can happen only in the presence of arbitrage.
1.1. Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce the general setting, consisting of two
financial markets associated to two different filtrations. We provide a new martingale representation
result and study (no-)arbitrage properties in the presence of inside information. Section 3 deals
with optimal consumption-investment problems under general preferences, allowing for non-trivial
initial information, leverage and arbitrage. In Section 4 we study the indifference value of inside
information and characterize under which conditions it is a universal value. Section 5 contains
three examples. For better readability, the proofs are collected in Section 6. Section 7 concludes by
discussing the role of market completeness and pointing out possible directions of further research.
1.2. Notation. Throughout the paper, we adopt the following conventions and notations, refer-
ring to [HWY92, JS03] for all unexplained notions related to stochastic calculus. Let (Ω,A,P) be a
generic probability space endowed with some filtration H = (Ht)t∈[0,T ] satisfying the usual condi-
tions of right-continuity and P-completeness, with T ∈ (0,+∞) a fixed time horizon. We denote by
M(P,H) (Mloc(P,H), resp.) the set of martingales (local martingales, resp.) on (Ω,H,P) and we
tacitly assume that every local martingale has ca`dla`g paths a.s. For a given Rd-valued semimartin-
gale X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] on (Ω,H,P), we denote by L(X,H) the set of all H-predictable Rd-valued
processes ϕ = (ϕt)t∈[0,T ] which are integrable with respect to X in the filtration H. Recall that the
set L(X,H) is invariant under equivalent changes of measure (see, e.g., [HWY92, Theorem 12.22]).
The stochastic integral of ϕ ∈ L(X,H) with respect to X is denoted by (ϕ ·X)t :=
∫
(0,t] ϕu dXu, for
all t ∈ [0, T ], with (ϕ ·X)0 = 0. Finally, we denote by O(H) and P(H), respectively, the optional
and predictable sigma-fields on Ω× [0, T ] with respect to the filtration H. For an adapted process
Y = (Yt)t∈[0,T ], we write Y ∈ O+(H) to denote that Y is a non-negative O(H)-measurable process.
2. The ordinary and the insider financial markets
In this section, we first present the ordinary financial market (Section 2.1), consisting of a general
arbitrage-free complete financial market in a reference filtration F. In Section 2.2, we introduce
the initially enlarged filtration G associated to the inside information and state a new martingale
representation result in G. In Section 2.3, we characterize the (no-)arbitrage properties of the
financial market under inside information.
2.1. The ordinary financial market. We consider a probability space (Ω,A,P) endowed with a
filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] satisfying the usual conditions, where T < +∞ represents a fixed invest-
ment horizon. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that the initial sigma-field F0 is trivial.
On (Ω,F,P), we let S = (St)t∈[0,T ] be a d-dimensional non-negative semimartingale, representing
the prices of d risky assets, discounted with respect to some baseline security1.
We call ordinary financial market the tuple (Ω,F,P;S), where the filtration F is supposed to
represent the publicly available information. We assume that S satisfies the no free lunch with
1The non-negativity assumption on S is made for simplicity of presentation and can be relaxed at the expense of
slightly greater technicalities, introducing the notion of sigma-martingale (see, e.g., [DS98, TS14]).
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vanishing risk (NFLVR) condition on (Ω,F,P), see [DS98]. More specifically, we shall assume the
validity of the following condition throughout the paper.
Standing Assumption 1. There exists a unique probability measure Q on (Ω,FT ) such that
Q ∼ P and S ∈Mloc(Q,F).
Assumption 1 implies that the ordinary financial market (Ω,F,P;S) is arbitrage-free (in the sense
of NFLVR) and complete.2 Indeed, by [Jac79, Theorem 11.3], every local martingale on (Ω,F,Q)
can be represented as a stochastic integral of S. In particular, every FT -measurable (bounded)
contingent claim can be replicated by self-financing trading. We denote by Z = (Zt)t∈[0,T ] the
density process of Q with respect to P on F, i.e., Zt = dQ|Ft/dP|Ft , for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Recall that
Z is a strictly positive martingale on (Ω,F,P) with Z0 = 1.
Remark 2.1. Assumption 1 can be relaxed by only requiring the existence of a unique equivalent
local martingale deflator for S on (Ω,F,P) (see [Kar12]). This ensures that NUPBR holds on
(Ω,F,P;S), so that portfolio optimization problems can be meaningfully solved in F. In view
of [SY98, Corollary 2.1], this condition also suffices to ensure that the ordinary financial market
(Ω,F,P;S) is complete. However, since the main goal of the present paper is to study the value
of inside information generating arbitrage opportunities, when the latter are impossible to achieve
on the basis of ordinary information alone, we find it more natural to work under Assumption 1.
2.2. The initially enlarged filtration G. We assume that the inside information is generated
by an A-measurable random variable L taking values in a Lusin space (E,BE), where BE denotes
the Borel sigma-field of E. The associated initially enlarged filtration G = (Gt)t∈[0,T ] is defined as
the smallest filtration containing F and such that L is G0-measurable, i.e., Gt := Ft ∨ σ(L), for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. We denote by λ : BE → [0, 1] the unconditional law of L, so that λ(B) = P(L ∈ B) holds
for all B ∈ BE . For each t ∈ [0, T ], let νt : Ω×BE → [0, 1] be a regular version of the Ft-conditional
law of L (which always exists since (E,BE) is Lusin).
Throughout the paper, we shall assume the validity of the following condition, which is known
as Jacod’s density hypothesis in enlargement of filtrations theory (see [Jac85]).
Standing Assumption 2. For all t ∈ [0, T ], νt ≪ λ holds in the a.s. sense.
Assumption 2 was introduced in the seminal work [Jac85] in order to prove the validity of the
H ′-hypothesis, namely that every F-semimartingale is also a G-semimartingale. In a frictionless
financial market, the failure of the semimartingale property is incompatible with NUPBR (see
[KP11]), which is in turn a necessary condition for the solution of portfolio optimization problems
(see [KK07, Proposition 4.19]). Therefore, the validity of the H ′-hypothesis represents a necessary
requirement in our framework (in this respect, see also Remark 3.9).
A central feature of our work is that Assumption 2 is only required to hold as an absolute
continuity relation and not as an equivalence, as explained in the introduction. This fact turns out
to be intimately linked to the existence of arbitrage opportunities in G (see Theorem 2.4). As a
preliminary, the following lemma presents some fundamental consequences of Assumption 2.
2The relevance of the market completeness assumption will be discussed in Section 7.
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Lemma 2.2. The filtration G is right-continuous and every semimartingale on (Ω,F,P) is also
a semimartingale on (Ω,G,P). There exists a (BE ⊗O(F))-measurable function E × Ω× [0, T ] ∋
(x, ω, t) 7→ qxt (ω) ∈ R+, ca`dla`g in t ∈ [0, T ] and such that:
(i) for every t ∈ [0, T ], νt(dx) = qxt λ(dx) holds a.s.;
(ii) for every x ∈ E, the process qx = (qxt )t∈[0,T ] is a martingale on (Ω,F,P).
Furthermore, it holds that P(qLt > 0) = 1, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Under the present standing assumptions, we can establish the following proposition, which pro-
vides a fundamental martingale representation result in the initially enlarged filtration G.
Proposition 2.3. Let M = (Mt)t∈[0,T ] be a local martingale on (Ω,G,P). Then there exists a
process K = (Kt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ L(S,G) such that
Mt =
Zt
qLt
(
M0 + (K · S)t
)
a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
The above proposition shows that the martingale representation property of S on (Ω,F,Q) can
be transferred to the initially enlarged filtration G under P up to a suitable “change of nume´raire”,
represented by the process Z/qL. Furthermore, the process Z/qL plays a key role in the study of
the (no-)arbitrage properties of S on (Ω,G,P), as we are going to see in Section 2.3.
2.3. Market viability under inside information. An agent endowed with inside information
(informed agent) is supposed to have access to the information generated by L, i.e., to the initially
enlarged filtration G. An informed agent can trade in the same set of securities available in the
ordinary financial market, but is allowed to rely on the information flow G when constructing
portfolios. We call the tuple (Ω,G,P;S) the insider financial market, recalling that Assumption 2
ensures that S is a semimartingale on (Ω,G,P) (see Lemma 2.2).
We are especially interested in the situation where the additional information generated by
L yields arbitrage opportunities, so that NFLVR does not hold in the insider financial market
(Ω,G,P;S). However, we need to ensure that (Ω,G,P;S) still represents a viable financial market,
in the sense that portfolio optimization problems can be meaningfully solved. To this effect, in
view of [KK07, Proposition 4.19], the minimal no-arbitrage requirement is represented by the no
unbounded profit with bounded risk (NUPBR) condition, defined as the boundedness in probability
of the set
{
(ϕ ·S)T : ϕ ∈ L(S,G) and (ϕ ·S)t ≥ −1 a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]
}
. By [TS14, Theorem 2.6]
(see also [Kar12, Theorem 2.1] in the case d = 1), S satisfies NUPBR on (Ω,G,P) if and only if
Z := {Z ∈ Mloc(P,G) : Z > 0, Z0 = 1 and ZS ∈ Mloc(P,G)} 6= ∅,
with Z denoting the set of equivalent local martingale deflators (ELMDs) for S on (Ω,G,P).
The following result provides a complete characterization of the (no-)arbitrage properties of the
insider financial market (Ω,G,P;S), in the sense of both NUPBR and NFLVR.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose that the space L1(Ω,FT ,P) is separable. Then, NUPBR holds on (Ω,G,P)
if and only if the set {qx = 0 < qx−} is evanescent for λ-a.e. x ∈ E. In this case, it holds that
Z = {Z/qL}. Moreover, the following properties are equivalent:
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(i) S satisfies NFLVR on (Ω,G,P);
(ii) for all t ∈ [0, T ], λ≪ νt holds in the a.s. sense;
(iii) P(qxT > 0) = 1 for λ-a.e. x ∈ E;
(iv) E[1/qLT ] = 1;
(v) E[ZT/qLT ] = 1;
(vi) the process 1/qL = (1/qLt )t∈[0,T ] is a martingale on (Ω,G,P);
(vii) the process N/qL = (Nt/q
L
t )t∈[0,T ] is a martingale on (Ω,G,P), for every N ∈ M(P,F).
The sufficiency of the condition that {qx = 0 < qx−} is evanescent for λ-a.e. x ∈ E for NUPBR
to hold in G has been shown in [AFK16, Theorem 1.12] (see also [ACJ15, Theorem 6]). In our
setting, the completeness of the financial market enables us to prove that the same condition is also
necessary for NUPBR to hold in (Ω,G,P;S). We point out that, in Theorem 2.4, the separability
assumption is only needed in the proof of the necessity part. Motivated by the above theorem, we
now introduce our last standing assumption, which will be assumed throughout the paper.
Standing Assumption 3. The set {qx = 0 < qx−} is evanescent for λ-a.e. x ∈ E.
We are especially interested in the case where the densities qx can reach zero, as this is intimately
related to the existence of arbitrage opportunities in the insider financial market (Ω,G,P;S). In
general, the densities qx can reach zero either in a continuous way or due to a jump to zero.
Assumption 3 excludes a jump-to-zero behavior. As shown in Theorem 2.4, under our standing
assumptions, the set of ELMDs for S on (Ω,G,P) is non-empty and consists of a singleton. In
particular, in view of [SY98, Corollary 2.1], the latter property implies that the insider financial
market (Ω,G,P;S) inherits the completeness of the ordinary financial market (Ω,F,P;S).
The last part of Theorem 2.4 gives a precise characterization of when the inside information
generates arbitrage opportunities for an informed agent. This happens if and only if the FT -
conditional law νT of L fails to be equivalent with respect to the unconditional law λ. The failure
of the equivalence means that there exist some scenarios that, from the point of view of an ordinary
agent, are a priori possible (i.e., they have a strictly positive λ-measure) but can be later revealed
to be impossible (i.e., they can be assigned zero νT -measure). For an informed agent, such scenarios
would be excluded already before the beginning of trading, thus providing a clear informational
advantage. This phenomenon will also be clarified by the examples considered in Section 5.
Remark 2.5 (On optimal arbitrage). Theorem 2.4 shows that NFLVR holds in (Ω,G,P;S) if and
only if E[ZT /qLT ] = 1. Observe that E[ZT /q
L
T ] corresponds to the average cost of replicating the
constant payoff 1 in (Ω,G,P;S), as shown in the proof of Theorem 2.4. In the terminology of
[CT15], the quantity 1/E[ZT /qLT ] is the optimal arbitrage profit, if E[ZT /q
L
T ] < 1. In this sense,
Theorem 2.4 shows that NFLVR holds in (Ω,G,P;S) if and only if no optimal arbitrage is possible.
Remark 2.6 (On the nume´raire portfolio). The unique ELMD Z/qL is tradable, in the sense that
there exists a process φ ∈ L(S,G) such that qL/Z = 1 + φ · S (this is a direct consequence of
Proposition 2.3, taking M ≡ 1). In other words, adopting the terminology of [KKS16], the process
1 + φ · S is the local martingale nume´raire for the insider financial market (Ω,G,P;S).
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3. Optimal consumption-investment problems under inside information
In this section, we study general optimal consumption-investment problems via duality tech-
niques, allowing for state-dependent utilities and intermediate consumption. Similarly to [ABS03],
we allow for a non-trivial initial information, represented by the inside information generated by
the random variable L. However, since we are especially interested in the case where the knowl-
edge of L yields arbitrage opportunities, we have to depart from a classical duality approach based
on martingale measures. The results of this section represent fundamental ingredients for the
computation of the value of informational arbitrage, which will be discussed in Section 4.
3.1. Admissible portfolios. We fix a stochastic clock κ = (κt)t∈[0,T ], which is a non-decreasing
ca`dla`g F-adapted bounded process with κ0=0 and such that P(κT >0|σ(L)) > 0 a.s. The stochastic
clock κ represents the notion of time according to which consumption is assumed to occur.
A portfolio is defined as a triplet Π = (v, ϑ, c), where v ∈ R represents an initial capital,
ϑ = (ϑt)t∈[0,T ] is an Rd-valued S-integrable process representing the holdings in the d risky assets
and c = (ct)t∈[0,T ] is a non-negative process representing the consumption rate. For an ordinary
agent, the strategy ϑ and the consumption process c are required to be measurable with respect
to P(F) and O(F), respectively. On the other hand, an informed agent is allowed to construct
portfolios by choosing P(G)-measurable strategies ϑ and O(G)-measurable consumption processes
c. The value process V v,ϑ,c = (V v,ϑ,ct )t∈[0,T ] of a portfolio Π = (v, ϑ, c) is defined as
V v,ϑ,ct := v +
∫ t
0
ϑu dSu −
∫ t
0
cu dκu, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Definition 3.1. Let H ∈ {F,G}, k ∈ R+ and v ∈ R. The set of H-admissible portfolios with
initial capital v and allowable credit line k, denoted by AH,k+ (v), is defined as
AH,k+ (v) :=
{
(ϑ, c) ∈ L(S,H)×O+(H) : V v,ϑ,ct ≥ −k a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ] and V v,ϑ,cT ≥ 0 a.s.
}
.
According to Definition 3.1, we assume that investors have access to a finite and fixed credit line
k over the investment horizon [0, T ], and are required to fully repay their debts by the terminal
date T . Observe that, in the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the requirement V v,ϑ,cT ≥ 0 a.s.
automatically implies that V v,ϑ,ct ≥ 0 a.s. for all t ≤ T (see [DS94, Proposition 3.5]), so that
AH,k+ (v) = AH,0+ (v), for all k ∈ R+. However, this is no longer true in the presence of arbitrage
opportunities. For k = 0, we recover from Definition 3.1 the usual notion of admissibility via non-
negative portfolios, as considered for instance in [KS98, GP98, Ame00, GK03, Mos15, CCFM17].
For convenience of notation, we define the processes ZF = (ZFt )t∈[0,T ] and ZG = (ZGt )t∈[0,T ] by
ZFt := Zt and Z
G
t := Zt/q
L
t , for all t ∈ [0, T ].
For later use, let us also define the two following classes of portfolios:
AH,ksm (v) :=
{
(ϑ, c) ∈ L(S,H)×O+(H) :
∫ T
0
ZHu cu dκu ∈ L1(P), V v,ϑ,cT ≥ 0 a.s.
and ZH V v+k,ϑ,c +
∫ ·
0
ZHu cu dκu is a supermartingale on (Ω,H,P)
}
,
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AH,km (v) :=
{
(ϑ, c) ∈ AH,ksm (v) : ZH V v+k,ϑ,c +
∫ ·
0
ZHu cu dκu ∈M(P,H)
}
.
As will be shown in the next subsection, the classes AH,ksm (v) and AH,km (v) appear naturally in
the solution of optimal investment-consumption problems. The requirement
∫ T
0 Z
H
u cu dκu ∈ L1(P)
ensures that the consumption process c = (ct)t∈[0,T ] can be financed via self-financing trading
starting from some initial capital, in the sense that there exists a pair (ζ, ϕ) ∈ L1+(P,H0)×L(S,H)
such that V ζ,ϕ,ct ≥ 0 a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ], with L1+(P,H0) denoting the set of H0-measurable
integrable non-negative random variables (compare with Lemma 3.4).
In the present setting characterized by two financial markets, a suitable definition of admissibility
should ensure that every portfolio which is admissible for an ordinary agent is also admissible for
an informed agent, in line with economic intuition. This property, as well as the relations between
the sets AH,k+ (v), AH,ksm (v) and AH,km (v), is clarified in the next lemma.
Lemma 3.2. For every v ∈ R and k ∈ R+, the following holds:
(i) AH,k+ (v) = AH,ksm (v), for H ∈ {F,G};
(ii) AF,k+ (v) ⊆ AG,k+ (v) and, therefore, AF,ksm (v) ⊆ AG,ksm (v).
Moreover, the inclusion AF,km (v) ⊆ AG,km (v) holds for every v ∈ R if and only if E[1/qLT ] = 1.
In view of Theorem 2.4, the above lemma shows that the inclusion AF,km (v) ⊆ AG,km (v) holds
if and only if there are no arbitrage opportunities in (Ω,G,P;S). If we think of martingales as
fair games, then the economic intuition underlying this property becomes clear. Indeed, portfolios
which are fair for an ordinary agent can be considered too expensive (and, hence, unfair) by an
informed agent if the latter has the possibility of achieving arbitrage. This intuition is in line with
the implication (i)⇒(v) in Theorem 2.4, where it is shown that if E[ZT /qLT ] < 1 (equivalently,
E[1/qLT ] < 1), then investing the total wealth in the riskless asset is not a fair strategy for an
informed agent, as the latter can replicate the constant payoff 1 starting from initial capital v < 1.
3.2. Optimal consumption-investment problems. We assume that preferences are defined
with respect to intermediate consumption over [0, T ] and/or wealth at the terminal date T . More
specifically, similarly as in [Zˇ05, Mos15, CCFM17], we introduce a utility stochastic field U =
U(ω, t, x) : Ω× [0, T ] × R+ → R ∪ {−∞} satisfying the following requirements.
Assumption 3.3. For every (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ], the function x 7→ U(ω, t, x) is strictly concave,
strictly increasing, continuously differentiable on (0,+∞) and satisfies the Inada conditions
lim
x↓0
U ′(ω, t, x) = +∞ and lim
x→+∞U
′(ω, t, x) = 0,
with U ′ denoting the derivative of U with respect to x. By continuity, we assume that U(ω, t, 0) =
limx↓0 U(ω, t, x). Finally, for every x ≥ 0, the stochastic process U(·, ·, x) is O(F)-measurable.
In the following, we shall always assume that a utility stochastic field satisfies Assumption 3.3,
unless otherwise mentioned. For H ∈ {F,G}, we define the following set of consumption processes:
CH,k+ (v) :=
{
c ∈ O+(H) : ∃ ϑ ∈ L(S,H) s.t. (ϑ, c) ∈ AH,k+ (v)
}
,
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corresponding to all consumption plans that can be financed by portfolios with initial capital v
satisfying the allowable credit line k. The optimal consumption-investment problem of an agent
having access to the information flow H and with initial capital v at t = 0 is defined as follows:3
(3.1) uH,k(v) := sup
c∈CH,k+ (v)
E
[∫ T
0
U(u, cu) dκu
]
,
with the convention E[
∫ T
0 U(u, cu) dκu] = −∞ if E[
∫ T
0 U
−(u, cu) dκu] = +∞. We also define the
related H0-conditional optimization problem (with possibly non-trivial initial information):
(3.2) ess sup
c∈CH,k+ (v)
E
[∫ T
0
U(u, cu) dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] ,
with an analogous convention. Note that an element c ∈ CH,k+ (v) attains the supremum in problem
(3.1) if it attains the supremum in problem (3.2) (see, e.g., [ABS03, Section 4]). We also remark
that the set CH,k+ (v) is closed in the topology of convergence in measure (dκ⊗P) as long as NUPBR
holds on (Ω,H,P;S) (see [CCFM17] and compare also with Lemma 3.4).
The above structure of preferences is very general and allows for state-dependent utilities. By
suitably specifying κ, several different formulations of optimal investment problems, with or with-
out intermediate consumption, can be recovered from the present setting (compare with [Zˇ05,
Section 2.8] and [Mos15, Examples 2.5-2.9]). In particular, the classical problem of maximization
of expected utility from terminal wealth is obtained by setting dκu = δT (du).
For convenience of notation, let us define the following sets of consumption processes, corre-
sponding to the different sets of admissible portfolios considered in Section 3.1:
CH,ksm (v) :=
{
c ∈ O+(H) : ∃ ϑ ∈ L(S,H) s.t. (ϑ, c) ∈ AH,ksm (v)
}
,
CH,km (v) :=
{
c ∈ O+(H) : ∃ ϑ ∈ L(S,H) s.t. (ϑ, c) ∈ AH,km (v) and V v,ϑ,cT = 0 a.s.
}
.
It is evident that CH,km (v) ⊆ CH,k+ (v), for every k ∈ R+ and v ∈ R. In the following lemma,
we show that the optimal expected utility does not change if one maximizes over all consumption
processes belonging to the smaller class CH,km (v). The economic intuition of this result is clear, as
a martingale is the least expensive supermartingale that reaches a given terminal value (compare
with [PH06, Lemma 10.4.1]). Furthermore, the condition V v,ϑ,cT = 0 a.s. represents the simple fact
that all the available resources are used to finance consumption.
Lemma 3.4. Let H ∈ {F,G}, k ∈ R+ and v ∈ R. Then, CH,k+ (v) = CH,ksm (v) and, for every
consumption process c ∈ O+(H), the following holds:
(i) c ∈ CH,k+ (v) if and only if E[
∫ T
0 Z
H
u cu dκu|H0] ≤ v + k(1− E[ZHT |H0]) a.s.;
(ii) c ∈ CH,km (v) if and only if E[
∫ T
0 Z
H
u cu dκu|H0] = v + k(1− E[ZHT |H0]) a.s.
Moreover, it holds that
(3.3) uH,k(v) = sup
c∈CH,km (v)
E
[∫ T
0
U(u, cu) dκu
]
=: uH,km (v).
3For simplicity of notation, we shall omit to write explicitly the dependence on ω in the utility stochastic field U .
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Remark 3.5. It is important to observe that the credit line (or allowable leverage) k plays no role
in the characterization of financeable consumption plans if and only if ZH ∈ M(P,H). In view
of (3.3), this implies that uH,k(v) = uH,0(v), for every v ∈ R+, if and only if ZH ∈ M(P,H). In
other words, the optimal expected utility does not depend on the allowable leverage if and only if
there are no arbitrage opportunities in (Ω,H,P;S). To this effect, see also Remark 3.7.
We are now in a position to derive the general solution to the optimal consumption-investment
problems (3.1)-(3.2). Similarly as in [Ame00, ABS03], we rely on a duality approach. However, since
in our setting arbitrage opportunities can exist, we have to rely on ELMDs instead of martingale
measures (compare with [KS98, Chapter 3] and [FR13]). Due to the strict concavity and contin-
uous differentiability of the utility stochastic field U (see Assumption 3.3), there exists a unique
stochastic field I = I(ω, t, y) : Ω× [0, T ]× (0,+∞)→ (0,+∞) such that U ′(ω, t, I(ω, t, y)) = y, for
all (ω, t, y) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× (0,+∞). Observe that, due to Assumption 3.3, for every strictly positive
H-optional process (Yt)t∈[0,T ], it holds that (I(ω, t, Yt(ω)))t∈[0,T ] ∈ O+(H).
Proposition 3.6. Let H ∈ {F,G}, k ∈ R+ and v ≥ −k(1 − ‖E[ZHT |H0]‖∞) =: vHk . Suppose that
there exists an H0-measurable random variable ΛH,k(v) : Ω→ (0,+∞) such that4
(3.4) E
[∫ T
0
ZHu I
(
u,ΛH,k(v)ZHu
)
dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] = v + k (1− E[ZHT |H0]) a.s.
and such that the process (I(t,ΛH,k(v)ZHt ))t∈[0,T ] satisfies
∫ T
0 U
−(u, I(u,ΛH,k(v)ZHu )) dκu ∈ L1(P).
Then, the optimal consumption process cH = (cHt )t∈[0,T ] solving problem (3.2) with initial capital v
and allowable leverage k is given by cHt = I(t,Λ
H,k(v)ZHt ), for all t ∈ [0, T ].
It can be easily shown that, if uH,k(v) < +∞, then the strict concavity of U implies that the
optimal consumption process cH = (cHt )t∈[0,T ] is unique up to a (dκ ⊗ P)-nullset. The associated
optimal trading strategy ϑH ∈ L(S,H) is given by the integrand appearing in the martingale
representation (see Proposition 2.3) of the local martingale M = (Mt)t∈[0,T ] on (Ω,H,P) defined
by Mt := E[
∫ T
t Z
H
u c
H
u dκu|Ht] +ZHt
∫ t
0 c
H
u dκu+ k(E[Z
H
T |Ht]−ZHt ), for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Note also that
the optimal solution does not depend on the allowable leverage k if NFLVR holds on (Ω,H,P;S).
The quantity vHk = −k(1−‖E[ZHT |H0]‖∞) introduced in Proposition 3.6 admits a clear economic
interpretation. Indeed, it represents the maximum amount of liabilities with which an agent can
start at t = 0. If v = vHk , then an agent can start trading by borrowing the amount k‖E[ZHT |H0]‖∞,
thus exhausting his credit line, and investing in the self-financing strategy which replicates the
constant payoff k. This strategy ensures the full repayment of all liabilities at date T and requires
an investment of kE[ZHT |H0] at t = 0 (see the proof of Theorem 2.4). The remaining resources
k(‖E[ZHT |H0]‖∞−E[ZHT |H0]) can possibly be used to finance consumption. For v < vHk , there does
not exist a strategy which can fully ensure the agent against his liabilities, so that CH,k+ (v) = ∅.
Remark 3.7. Let 0 ≤ k1 < k2 and suppose that there exist two H0-measurable random variables
ΛH,k1(v) and ΛH,k2(v) satisfying (3.4), for some v ≥ vHk1 . Since P(κT > 0|σ(L)) > 0 a.s., it can
be shown that ΛH,k1(v) ≥ ΛH,k2(v) a.s., with strict inequality holding on {E[ZHT |H0] < 1}. This
4For brevity of notation, we omit to write explicitly the dependence on ω in the stochastic field I .
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means that, in the presence of arbitrage, a deeper credit line yields a higher consumption rate. In
turn, this implies that uH,k(v) is strictly increasing in k if E[ZHT ] < 1 (see also Remark 3.5).
Remark 3.8. The existence of an H0-measurable random variable ΛH,k(v) solving equation (3.4) is
ensured if
∫ T
0 Z
H
u I(u, yZ
H
u ) dκu ∈ L1(P), for all y > 0. This corresponds to a classical condition in
the theory of expected utility maximization (see, e.g., [KLSX91, KS98] and [Ame00, Lemma 5.2]).
Remark 3.9. The structure of problems (3.1)-(3.2) together with the results of the present section
make clear that, if there exists an F-stopping time τ such that κτ = κT a.s., then Assumptions 2-3
can be relaxed and only assumed to hold on [[0, τ ]]. In particular, this allows to consider situations
where Assumption 2 holds on [0, T ) but fails at the terminal date T (for instance when L is an
FT -measurable continuous random variable, in which case the problem of maximizing expected
utility from wealth at date T does not have a solution in G, see [PK96, GP98, AIS98]).
3.3. Explicit solutions. In this section, we derive explicit solutions to the optimal consumption-
investment problem in the case of logarithmic, power, and exponential utility functions. Besides
allowing for intermediate consumption, this section generalizes [ABS03, Corollary 4.7] to the case
where the inside information can generate arbitrage opportunities. The results of this section will
be used in Section 4 for the explicit computation of the value of informational arbitrage. Corollaries
3.10 and 3.12 can have some interest on their own, as they provide explicit solutions to optimal
portfolio problems in general complete financial markets admitting arbitrage opportunities, in the
presence of non-trivial initial information and leverage.
Corollary 3.10. Let H ∈ {F,G}, k ∈ R+ and v > vHk . The optimal expected utilities in problem
(3.1) for logarithmic and power utility functions are explicitly given as follows:
(i) Let U(ω, t, x) = log(x), for all (ω, t, x) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× (0,+∞).
If
∫ T
0 log(1/Z
H
u ) dκu ∈ L1(P), then
(3.5)
uH,k(v) = E
[
log
(
v + k(1− E[ZHT |H0])
)
κT
]− E[log(E[κT |H0])κT ]+ E [∫ T
0
log
(
1
ZHu
)
dκu
]
.
(ii) Let U(ω, t, x) = xp/p, for some p ∈ (0, 1), for all (ω, t, x) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× (0,+∞).
If E[
∫ T
0 (Z
H
u )
p/(p−1) dκu|H0] < +∞ a.s., then
(3.6) uH,k(v) =
1
p
E
[(
v + k(1− E[ZHT |H0])
)p
E
[∫ T
0
(
ZHu
) p
p−1 dκu
∣∣∣∣H0]1−p
]
and uH,k(v) < +∞ if E[∫ T0 (ZHu ) pp−1 dκu|H0]1−p ∈ L1(P).
Observe that the optimal expected utilities do not depend on k if and only if there are no
arbitrage opportunities in (Ω,H,P;S), in line with Remark 3.5. On the other hand, in the presence
of arbitrage the optimal expected utility is strictly increasing in k, reflecting the fact that higher
levels of consumption can be financed by taking more leveraged positions in the arbitrage strategy.
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Remark 3.11. Consider the classical setting where dκu = δT (du) and U(ω, t, x) = log(x), cor-
responding to maximization of expected logarithmic utility from terminal wealth. Suppose that
uG,k(v) < +∞, for some k ∈ R+ and v > 0. Corollary 3.10 then implies that
uG,k(v)− uF,k(v) = E [log(v + k(1− E[ZGT |G0]))]+ E [log (1/ZGT )]− log(v)− E [log (1/ZFT )]
= E
[
log
(
1 +
k
v
(
1−Q(qxT > 0)
∣∣
x=L
))]
+ E
[
log(qLT )
]
,(3.7)
representing the utility gain of an informed agent with allowable leverage k. This result generalizes
[AIS98, Theorem 3.7], where relation (3.7) has been obtained under the additional assumptions
that the densities qx are a.s. strictly positive and continuous (and k = 0). Note also that
uG,k(v)− uF,k(v) ≥ uG,0(v)− uF,0(v) ≥ − log(E[1/qLT ]) ≥ 0.
By Theorem 2.4, this shows that the utility gain of an informed agent is always strictly positive if the
inside information represented by L allows for arbitrage in (Ω,G,P;S). Moreover, if L is a discrete
FT -measurable random variable, as considered in Sections 5.1-5.2, and k = 0, the utility gain of
an informed agent equals the entropy of L, i.e., E[log(qLT )] = −
∑
x∈E P(L = x) log(P(L = x)).
Let us now consider the case of exponential preferences. Even though exponential utility does
not satisfy Assumption 3.3 (the Inada condition at 0 fails), the optimal consumption process can be
characterized similarly as in Proposition 3.6. The next corollary can be seen as a semimartingale
version of [CH89, Theorem 2.4] (see also [MW12, Theorem 3.2] in a discrete-time setting).
Corollary 3.12. Let H ∈ {F,G}, k ∈ R+ and v > vHk . Suppose that U(ω, t, x) = −e−αx, for all
(ω, t, x) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]×R+, for α > 0. Then the optimal expected utility in problem (3.1) is given by
(3.8) uH,k(v) = − 1
α
E
[∫ T
0
(
ΛH,k(v)ZHu ∧ α
)
dκu
]
,
where the H0-measurable random variable ΛH,k(v) is the a.s. unique solution to the equation
(3.9)
1
α
E
[∫ T
0
ZHu
(
log
(
α
ΛH,k(v)ZHu
))+
dκu
∣∣∣∣H0
]
= v + k
(
1− E[ZHT |H0]
)
.
Equation 3.9 can be explicitly solved in some simple models. In particular, if dκu = δT (du)
and k = 0, a sufficient condition is that log(ZHT ) ≤ E[ZHT log(ZHT )|H0]/E[ZHT |H0] a.s. The latter
condition is always satisfied if Q = P and L is a discrete FT -measurable random variable generating
arbitrage opportunities in (Ω,G,P;S) (compare also with the examples given in Sections 5.1-5.2).
4. The utility indifference value of inside information
By relying on the results established in the previous section, we are now in a position to study
and compute the value of an inside information which potentially enables an informed agent to
achieve arbitrage opportunities. Inspired by [ABS03], we introduce the following definition.
Definition 4.1. For k ∈ R+ and v > 0, the utility indifference value of the inside information L
is defined as a solution pi = piU,k(v) ∈ R+ to the following equation:
(4.1) uF,k(v) = uG,k(v − pi).
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As explained in the introduction, the value piU,k(v) is such that an investor is indifferent between
two alternatives: (i) invest optimally the total initial wealth v on the basis of the publicly available
information; (ii) acquire the inside information L at the price piU,k(v) and invest optimally the
residual wealth v− piU,k(v), possibly exploiting the arbitrages generated by the knowledge of L. If
the inside information L allows an investor to achieve arbitrage, as considered in the examples of
Section 5, then we call the quantity piU,k(v) the indifference value of informational arbitrage.
The utility indifference value piU,k(v) exists and is unique under natural assumptions on the
optimal consumption-investment problem, as long as the expected utility maximization problem
of an informed agent is well-posed (i.e., it does not lead to infinite utility).
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that uF,0(v) > −∞, for every v > 0, and that the assumptions of Propo-
sition 3.6 are satisfied, for every k ∈ R+, v > vHk and H ∈ {F,G}. Assume furthermore that
uG,k(v0) < +∞, for some v0 > vGk . Then, for every v > 0, the following hold:
(i) If limwցvG
k
uG,k(w)<uF,0(v), then the utility indifference value piU,k(v) exists and is unique.
(ii) The map k 7→ piU,k(v) is strictly increasing if and only if E[1/qLT ] < 1.
(iii) If
∫
E(E[
∫ T
0 1{qxt =0}dκt] + kP(q
x
T = 0))λ(dx) > 0, then it always holds that pi
U,k(v) > 0.
The condition appearing in part (i) of the above theorem is always satisfied in the absence of
leverage (i.e., if k = 0). Indeed, ΛG,0(0) := limwց0ΛG,0(w) exists by monotonicity (see the proof of
Theorem 4.2 given in Section 6.3), with values in (0,+∞]. By continuity of I(ω, t, ·) and dominated
convergence, condition (3.4) gives that
E
[∫ T
0
ZGu I
(
u,ΛG,0(0)ZGu
)
dκu
∣∣∣∣G0] = 0.
Therefore, recalling that I(ω, t,+∞) := limy→+∞ I(ω, t, y) = 0, for all (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ], as a
consequence of the Inada conditions (see Assumption 3.3), it must hold that ΛG,0(0) = +∞ a.s.
By Proposition 3.6 and the reverse Fatou lemma, this implies that, for every v > 0,
lim
wց0
uG,0(w) = lim
wց0
E
[∫ T
0
U
(
u, I(u,ΛG,0(w)ZGu )
)
dκu
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
U
(
u, I(u,ΛG,0(0)ZGu )
)
dκu
]
= E
[∫ T
0
U
(
u, 0
)
dκu
]
< E
[∫ T
0
U
(
u,
v
E[κT ]ZFu
)
dκu
]
≤ uF,0(v),
where we have used the fact that the consumption process (v/(E[κT ]ZFt ))t∈[0,T ] is strictly posi-
tive and belongs to CF,0+ (v) (see Lemma 3.4). On the other hand, if k > 0, then the condition
limwցvG
k
uG,k(w) < uF,0(v) may not necessarily hold, as the combined possibility of leverage and
arbitrage may lead an informed agent to always outperform an uninformed agent, even when start-
ing from a liability position at t = 0. In this situation, an agent with initial wealth v would strictly
prefer to acquire the inside information at any price not greater than v − vGk . Note also that the
assumption uF,0(v) > −∞, for every v > 0, always holds if the utility stochastic field U is bounded
from below by a real-valued function (in particular, if U is deterministic).
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One of the implications of Theorem 4.2 is that, whenever the inside information L yields arbi-
trage, then the indifference value of informational arbitrage is strictly increasing in the allowable
leverage k. The economic intuition is that, having access to a deeper line of credit, an informed
agent can take more leveraged positions in the arbitrage strategies, yielding arbitrage profits which
can be scaled up to the limit of the allowable leverage. In turn, this enables an informed agent to
finance higher levels of consumption. Note that, if k > 0, then it may happen that piU,k(v) > v.
The condition
∫
E(E[
∫ T
0 1{qxt =0}dκt] + kP(q
x
T = 0))λ(dx) > 0 implies that an informed agent
can finance any consumption plan c ∈ CF,km (v) at a cost smaller than v, using the remaining
resources to increase consumption. This is possible since an informed agent does not need to finance
consumption in the states which are incompatible with the observed realization of L. In particular,
suppose that P(∆κT > 0) = 1 (or k > 0) and that P(qxT = 0) > 0, for all x belonging to some set
B with λ(B) > 0. This corresponds to the situation where a strictly positive weight is placed on
wealth at the terminal date T and the random variable L generates arbitrage (see Theorem 2.4).
In this case, part (iii) of Theorem 4.2 implies that the indifference value of informational arbitrage
is always strictly positive: an investor will always be willing to pay a strictly positive price to learn
the inside information, regardless of the specific preference structure.
The conclusions of Theorem 4.2 always hold for the utility functions considered in Section 3.3,
under suitable integrability conditions. This enables us to obtain explicit expressions for the utility
indifference value of the inside information L in the case k = 0 for logarithmic and power utility
functions, as shown in the next proposition, which generalizes [ABS03, Theorem 5.3] to the case
of an inside information yielding arbitrage opportunities and intermediate consumption.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that k = 0. Then the utility indifference value of the inside information
L is explicitly given as follows:
(i) Let U(ω, t, x) = log(x), for all (ω, t, x) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× (0,+∞).
If
∫ T
0 log(q
L
u /Zu) dκu ∈ L1(P), then, for every v > 0,
(4.2) pilog(v) = v
(
1− exp
(
1
E[κT ]
(
χG − χF − E
[∫ T
0
log(qLu ) dκu
])))
,
where χH := E[log(E[κT |H0])κT ], for H ∈ {F,G}.
(ii) Let U(ω, t, x) = xp/p, for some p ∈ (0, 1), for all (ω, t, x) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× (0,+∞).
If E[
∫ T
0 (Zu/q
L
u )
p
p−1 dκu|σ(L)]1−p ∈ L1(P), then, for every v > 0,
(4.3) pipwr(v) = v
1−
E
[∫ T
0 Z
p
p−1
u dκu
] 1−p
p
E
[
E
[∫ T
0 (Zu/q
L
u )
p
p−1 dκu
∣∣∣G0]1−p
]1/p
 .
In general, for k > 0 the utility indifference value of the inside information cannot be computed
in an explicit form for logarithmic and power preferences, as can be seen from (3.5)-(3.6).5 However,
5In view of Corollary 3.10, a fully explicit representation of the utility indifference value can be obtained when
the random variable k E[ZT /qLT |G0] is a.s. constant or, equivalently, when kQ(q
x
T > 0) does not depend on x.
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by part (ii) of Theorem 4.2, formulae (4.2) and (4.3) represent lower bounds for the indifference
value of the inside information for k > 0 for logarithmic and power utility functions, respectively.
Proposition 4.3 yields several interesting results on the value of informational arbitrage in the
case of logarithmic and power utility functions. In particular:
• If ∫E E[∫ T0 1{qxt =0}dκt]λ(dx) > 0, then pilog(v) and pipwr(v) are always strictly increasing
with respect to v. This property is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.2 and formulae
(4.2)-(4.3). In other words, the value of informational arbitrage is strictly increasing with
respect to initial wealth, in line with the analysis of [LPS10] in the case of a CRRA utility.
• In the case of logarithmic utility, the indifference value pilog(v) is lower when preferences
are defined over intermediate consumption rather than terminal wealth only, confirming
the empirical findings of [LPS10]. This follows from the observation that
E
[∫ T
0
log(qLu )dκu
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
log(qLT )dκu
]
= E
[
log(qLT )κT
]
,
where the inequality follows by taking theG-optional projection of log(qLT ) and noting that,
by Jensen’s inequality and the G-supermartingale property of 1/qL,
E
[
log(qLT )|Gt
] ≥ log (E[1/qLT |Gt]−1) ≥ log(qLt ) a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
• Jensen’s inequality applied to the convex function x 7→ x log x implies that the term χG−χF
appearing in (4.2) is non-negative, with χG = χF if and only if E[κT |σ(L)] = E[κT ] a.s.
In turn, this means that if the inside information L has predictive power on κT , then the
indifference value pilog(v) is lower than in the case where L has no predictive power on κT .
While this result seems counterintuitive at first sight, it can be explained by the features of
logarithmic preferences. We can think of κT (ω) as the total weight assigned to utility from
consumption over [0, T ] in state ω. By the specific structure of the optimal consumption
process for logarithmic utility (see the proof of Corollary 3.10), if P(E[κT |σ(L)] 6= E[κT ]) >
0, then an informed agent consumes more in the states ω which are more likely to be
weighted less, and vice versa. However, as a consequence of risk aversion, an agent would a
priori prefer to smooth consumption over different states. This intuitively explains why the
presence of predictive power of L on κT leads to a lower indifference value of information.
Note that χG = χF if κT is deterministic, as in the case of utility from terminal wealth.
Remark 4.4. In the case of utility from terminal wealth (corresponding to dκu = δT (du)), it can be
easily verified that formulae (4.2)-(4.3) reduce to the expressions stated in [ABS03, Theorem 5.3]
whenever one of the equivalent conditions of the second part of Theorem 2.4 holds, i.e., whenever
the inside information does not lead to arbitrage opportunities in (Ω,G,P;S). For dκu = δT (du),
formula (4.2) reduces to pilog(v) = v(1 − exp(−E[log(qLT )])). In line with Theorem 4.2 (see also
Remark 3.11), this confirms that the indifference value is always strictly positive if the inside
information L allows for arbitrage in (Ω,G,P;S). Moreover, the logarithmic indifference value is
fully determined by the entropy of L whenever L is a discrete FT -measurable random variable.
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Universal results on the indifference value of inside information. In general, the indiffer-
ence value of the inside information depends on the stochastic utility field considered. However,
in some special cases (for instance, in the example given in the introduction), the indifference
value is a universal value, which does not depend on the preference structure. This situation is
clarified by the next theorem. We denote by U the class of all strictly increasing and concave
deterministic utility functions U : R+ → R ∪ {−∞}. In the statement of the following theorem,
we denote by uH,k(v) the value function associated to problem (3.1) in the case of expected utility
from consumption only at date T (i.e., terminal wealth) with utility function U .
Theorem 4.5. Suppose that Q = P in Assumption 1 and that dκu = δT (du). Then, the following
three conditions are equivalent:
(i) it holds that P(qLT = q) = 1, for some constant q ≥ 1;
(ii) for every k ∈ R+ and v > 0, there exists a universal value pik(v) ∈ [0, v + k) such that
uG,k
(
v − pik(v)) = uF,k(v), for all U ∈ U ;
(iii) for every v > 0, there exists a universal value pi0(v) ∈ [0, v) such that
uG,0
(
v − pi0(v)) = uF,0(v), for all U ∈ U .
In those cases, for every U ∈ U , k ∈ R+ and v > 0, the indifference value pik(v) is always given by
(4.4) pik(v) = (v + k)
(
1− 1
q
)
and the optimal wealth process V G = (V Gt )t∈[0,T ] in problem (3.1) for H = G is always given by
(4.5) V Gt = (v + k)
qLt
qLT
− k, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
In the setting of the above theorem, the optimal strategy for an informed agent is given by a
multiple of the process φ ∈ L(S,G) appearing in the stochastic integral representation qL = 1+φ·S
(see Remark 2.6). This shows an interesting property: under the conditions of Theorem 4.5, the
optimal portfolio for an informed agent will always be the nume´raire portfolio in the financial
market (Ω,G,P;S), regardless of the preference structure. Equivalently, the constant payoff v =
v− pik(v) + (v+ k− pik(v))(φ · S)T dominates according to the second order stochastic dominance
criterion (see, e.g., [Ing87, Chapter 5]) all possible outcomes of admissible portfolios.
Remark 4.6. The random variable qLT is always deterministic whenever L is an FT -measurable
discrete random variable with uniform distribution on a finite set E, so that P(L = x) = 1/|E| for
all x ∈ E. Indeed, in this case it holds that qxT = 1{L=x}|E|, for all x ∈ E, so that qLT = |E|. This
is also the case of Example 1.1, as we shall explain in detail in Section 5.1.
Remark 4.7. If there are no arbitrage opportunities in (Ω,G,P;S), then the only case in which
condition (i) of Theorem 4.5 holds is when the random variable L is independent of FT . Indeed,
if NFLVR holds in (Ω,G,P;S) and the random variable qLT is a.s. constant, then q
L
T = 1 a.s., as a
consequence of Theorem 2.4. Therefore, it holds that qxT = 1 (P ⊗ λ)-a.e., which by formula (6.1)
implies that E[h(L)1A] = E[h(L)]P(A), for every BE-measurable bounded function h : E → R
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and A ∈ FT , so that L is independent of FT . Conversely, if L is independent of FT , then clearly
qxT = 1 for all x ∈ E. In this case, formula (4.4) implies that it will never be attractive to buy the
informational content of the random variable L, simply because the latter does not provide any
useful information on the financial market.
The assumptions of Theorem 4.5 cannot be easily relaxed. Indeed, if dκu = δT (du) but Q 6= P,
then condition (i) does not suffice to ensure the existence of a universal indifference value, as can be
shown by a simple modification of the example given in Section 5.1. Similarly, even if Q = P, in the
presence of intermediate consumption the utility indifference value can depend on the preference
structure even if qLT is deterministic (apart from the trivial case where L is independent of FT ).
Under the same assumptions of Theorem 4.5, we can establish some universal bounds for the
indifference value of informational arbitrage, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.8. Suppose that Q = P in Assumption 1 and that dκu = δT (du). Assume fur-
thermore that there exist two strictly positive constants qmin and qmax with qmin ≤ qmax such that
P(qLT ∈ [qmin, qmax]) = 1. Then, for every utility function U ∈ U , k ∈ R+ and v > 0, it holds that
(4.6) (v + k)
(
1− 1
qmin
)+
≤ piU,k(v) ≤ (v + k)
(
1− 1
qmax
)
.
The universal bounds derived in the above proposition will be illustrated in the context of the
examples discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
5. Examples
In this section, we illustrate some of the main concepts and results in the context of three
examples. The first example (Section 5.1) consists of a generalization of Example 1.1. The second
example (Section 5.2) considers a two-dimensional discontinuous financial market, where the inside
information corresponds to the ratio of the terminal values of two assets. In these two examples,
the random variable L is discrete. In the third example (Section 5.3) we consider a continuous
random variable L generating informational arbitrage.
5.1. One-dimensional geometric Brownian motion. LetW = (Wt)t∈[0,T ] be a one-dimensional
Brownian motion on the filtered probability space (Ω,A,F,P), where F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is the P-
augmentation of the natural filtration of W . We consider a financial market where a single risky
asset is traded, with discounted price process S = (St)t∈[0,T ] satisfying
(5.1) dSt = St σt dWt, S0 > 0,
where σ = (σt)t∈[0,T ] is a strictly positive F-predictable process such that
∫ T
0 σ
2
t dt < +∞ a.s.
According to the notation introduced in Section 2.1, the tuple (Ω,F,P;S) represents the ordinary
financial market and Assumption 1 is satisfied with Q = P.
Similarly as in [PK96, Example 4.6], we suppose that the inside information is generated by the
random variable L := 1{WT≥c}, where c is a constant such that P(WT ≥ c) = r ∈ (0, 1). In this
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setting, E = {0, 1} and the unconditional law of L is given by λ({0}) = 1 − r and λ({1}) = r.
Since L is discrete, Assumption 2 is automatically satisfied. In particular, it holds that
q0t =
P(L = 0|Ft)
P(L = 0)
=
1
1− r Φ
(
c−Wt√
T − t
)
, q1t =
P(L = 1|Ft)
P(L = 1)
=
1
r
Φ
(
Wt − c√
T − t
)
,
for every t ∈ [0, T ), where Φ(x) := ∫ x−∞ 1√2pie−z2/2 dz. For t = T , we have that
q0T =
1
1− r 1{WT<c}, q
1
T =
1
r
1{WT≥c}.
Since q0 and q1 have continuous paths, Assumption 3 is satisfied. Moreover, it holds that
qLT =
1
1− r 1{WT<c} +
1
r
1{WT≥c}.
In view of Theorem 2.4, NUPBR holds in the insider financial market (Ω,G,P;S) and 1/qL is
the associated ELMD. However, since E[1/qLT ] < 1, the inside information leads to arbitrage and
NFLVR does not hold. The boundedness of qLT ensures that all the assumptions of Proposition
4.3 are satisfied and, therefore, we can compute explicitly the indifference value of informational
arbitrage. For simplicity of presentation, let us consider the problem of maximizing expected utility
of terminal wealth (i.e., dκu = δT (du)) for k = 0. In this case, for every v > 0, it holds that
pilog(v) = v
(
1− (1− r)1−rrr) and pipwr(v) = v (1− ((1− r)1−p + r1−p)−1/p) .
Observe that pipwr(v) is increasing with respect to p, meaning that the indifference value of infor-
mational arbitrage is decreasing with respect to risk aversion. Furthermore, pipwr(v) converges to
pilog(v) as p→ 0, for every v > 0.
In the case of an exponential utility function with risk aversion α > 0, an application of Corollary
3.12 shows that
uG,0(v) = −E[e−αvqLT ] = −(1− r)e− αv1−r − re−αvr ,
for every v ∈ R+. Therefore, the indifference value of informational arbitrage in the case of
exponential utility is given by the unique solution pi = piexp(v) to the following equation:
e−αv = (1− r)e− α1−r (v−pi) + re−αr (v−pi).
Note also that, in the context of the present example, for every strictly increasing and concave
deterministic utility function U : R+ → R ∪ {−∞} and for every k ∈ R+, the indifference value of
informational arbitrage piU,k(v) satisfies the following bounds, as a consequence of Proposition 4.8:
min{r, 1 − r} ≤ pi
U,k(v)
v + k
≤ max{r, 1 − r}, for all v > 0.
Analysis of Example 1.1. If c = 0 (and, hence, r = 1/2), the random variable qLT reduces to the
constant qLT = 2. In this case, in line with the result of Theorem 4.5 (see also Remark 4.6), the
value of informational arbitrage for k = 0 is equal to the universal value pi0(v) = v/2. In view of
formula (4.5), the corresponding optimal wealth process V G = (V Gt )t∈[0,T ] is given by
V Gt = v
qLt
qLT
= v
(
Φ
( −Wt√
T − t
)
1{WT<0} +Φ
(
Wt√
T − t
)
1{WT≥0}
)
,
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for all t ∈ [0, T ]. An application of Itoˆ’s formula yields Φ( Wt√
T−t) =
1
2+
1√
2pi
∫ t
0
1√
T−u exp(−
W 2u
2(T−u))dWu,
so that the optimal strategy ϑG = (ϑGt )t∈[0,T ] for the informed agent is explicitly given by
(5.2) ϑGt =
(
1{WT≥0} − 1{WT<0}
) v
σtSt
1√
2pi(T − t) exp
(
− W
2
t
2(T − t)
)
, for all t ∈ [0, T ),
regardless of the utility function being considered. In particular, the strategy ϑG is an arbitrage
strategy for an informed agent. Indeed, it holds that (ϑG ·S)t = V Gt −v/2 > −v/2, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
and (ϑG · S)T = v/2 > 0. This shows that, by acquiring the inside information L at the price
pi0(v) = v/2 and following the strategy ϑG, an informed agent can achieve exactly the terminal
wealth v, which also corresponds to the optimal terminal wealth for an ordinary agent.
Remark 5.1 (On the universal optimal strategy ϑG). In the setting of the present example, the
optimal strategy ϑG calculated in (5.2) has several interesting features:
(i) the strategy is always long or short in the risky asset depending on the inside information
revealed at the beginning of trading;
(ii) the strategy is a bet on the risky asset: the position on the risky asset increases if the asset
price decreases and, vice versa, decreases if the asset price increases;
(iii) it holds that limt→T ϑGt = 0, meaning that the position in the risky asset is completely
liquidated at the end of the investment horizon;
(iv) ϑG is a multiple of the trading strategy which realizes the optimal arbitrage in G (see
Remark 2.5 and compare with the proof of the implication (i)⇒(v) in Theorem 2.4).
5.2. Two-dimensional Poisson process. The example of Section 5.1 considers a single risky
asset with continuous paths. We now present an example of inside information leading to arbitrage
in a financial market with two risky assets with discontinuous paths.
Let N1 = (N1t )t∈[0,T ] and N2 = (N2t )t∈[0,T ] be two independent Poisson processes with common
intensity 1 on a filtered probability space (Ω,A,F,P), where F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is the P-augmentation
of the natural filtration of (N1, N2). We consider two risky assets, with discounted price processes
S1 = (S1t )t∈[0,T ] and S2 = (S2t )t∈[0,T ] satisfying
dS1t = S
1
t−(dN
1
t − dt), S10 > 0;
dS2t = S
2
t−(dN
2
t − dt), S20 > 0,
with explicit solutions Sit = S
i
0 e
−t 2N it , for i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ [0, T ]. The tuple (Ω,F,P; (S1, S2))
represents the ordinary financial market and, since (S1, S2) has the martingale representation
property on (Ω,F,P), Assumption 1 is satisfied with Q = P.
Let us define the processN = (Nt)t∈[0,T ] by Nt := N1t −N2t , for all t ∈ [0, T ]. We suppose that the
inside information is generated by the observation of the random variable L := NT , corresponding
to the knowledge of the ratio S1T /S
2
T of the terminal prices of the two assets. The distribution of
the random variable L can been explicitly computed and is given by
P(L = x) = e−2T I|x|(2T ) = e−2T
∑
k∈N
T 2k+|x|
k!(k + |x|)! , for all x ∈ Z,
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where I|x|(2T ) denotes the modified Bessel function of the first kind. Since L is discrete, Assump-
tion 2 is automatically satisfied and, similarly as in [CRT18], it can be computed that
qxt =
P(L = x|Ft)
P(L = x)
=
∑
k∈N e
−(T−t) (T−t)k
k! e
−(T−t) (T−t)k+x−Nt
(k+x−Nt)! 1{k+x−Nt≥0}∑
k∈N e−2T
T 2k+|x|
k!(k+|x|)!
,
for all x ∈ Z and t ∈ [0, T ). For t = T , we have that
qxT =
1{L=x}
P(L = x)
=
1{L=x}
e−2T
∑
k∈N
T 2k+|x|
k!(k+|x|)!
, for all x ∈ Z.
Note that qxt > 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ). Moreover, the filtration F is quasi-left-continuous and, hence,
it holds that
∨
t<T Ft = FT− = FT . By the Le´vy upward theorem, as t→ T it holds that
E[1{L=x}|Ft] −→ E[1{L=x}|FT−] = E[1{L=x}|FT ] = 1{L=x} a.s.
thus showing that qx does not jump to zero. Assumption 3 is therefore satisfied and the in-
sider financial market (Ω,G,P;S) satisfies NUPBR (see Theorem 2.4). The inside information L
generates arbitrage opportunities for an informed agent, since E[1/qLT ] =
∑
x∈Z P(L = x)
2 < 1.
However, due to admissibility constraints, such arbitrage opportunities cannot be realized by naive
long-and-short strategies in the two assets S1 and S2, as the latter are unbounded from above.
The indifference value of informational arbitrage can be explicitly computed in the case of
logarithmic and power utility functions by relying on Proposition 4.3 (for simplicity of presentation,
we only consider the case dκu = δT (du) and k = 0):
pilog(v) = v
(
1− exp
(
−
∑
x∈Z
P(L = x) log P(L = x)
))
,
pipwr(v) = v
1− E
(∑
x∈Z
1{L=x}P(L = x)p/(p−1)
)1−p−1/p
 = v
1−(∑
x∈Z
P(L = x)1−p
)−1/p ,
for every v > 0. In particular, note that in the case of a logarithmic utility function the value of
informational arbitrage is determined by the entropy of the random variable L (see Remark 3.11).
In the case of an exponential utility function with risk aversion α > 0, an application of Corollary
3.12 shows that piexp(v) is given by the unique solution pi = piexp(v) to the following equation:
e−αv = E
[
exp
(
−αqLT (v − pi)
)]
=
∑
x∈Z
P(L = x)e−
α(v−pi)
P(L=x) .
Note also that, as a consequence of Proposition 4.8, for every strictly increasing and concave utility
function U , the indifference value of informational arbitrage piU,k(v) is bounded from below by the
quantity (v+k)P(L 6= 0), for every v > 0. This follows from the fact that 0 = argmaxx∈Z I|x|(2T ).
5.3. Informational arbitrage induced by a continuous random variable. The examples
considered in Sections 5.1-5.2 involve discrete random variables. We now present an example of a
filtration initially enlarged with respect to a continuous random variable L satisfying the absolute
continuity relation of Assumption 2 and generating arbitrage opportunities for an informed agent.
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LetW = (Wt)t∈[0,T ] be a one-dimensional Brownian motion on (Ω,A,F,P), where F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ]
is the P-augmentation of the natural filtration of W . Let U be a random variable with uniform
distribution on [0, 1], independent of the Brownian motionW , and assume that A = FT ∨σ(U). We
consider a financial market with a single risky asset, with discounted price process S = (St)t∈[0,T ]
given as in (5.1). Similarly as in Section 5.1, the tuple (Ω,F,P;S) represents the ordinary financial
market and Assumption 1 is satisfied with Q = P.
We define the random variable L by
L :=
W ∗T
2(1 +W ∗T )
+
U
1 +W ∗T
,
where W ∗T := supt∈[0,T ]Wt. The random variable L takes values in [0, 1] and, conditionally on FT ,
is uniformly distributed on [a(W ∗T ), b(W
∗
T )], where a(y) := y/(2+ 2y) and b(y) := (2+ y)/(2 + 2y),
for y ∈ R+. Due to the reflection principle of Brownian motion, the unconditional law λ of L can
be computed as
λ([0, x]) = P(L ≤ x) = E[f(x,W ∗T )] =√ 2piT
∫ +∞
0
f(x, z) e−
z2
2T dz,
for x ∈ [0, 1], where f(x, z) := (z(x− 1/2) +x)+ ∧ 1, for all (x, z) ∈ [0, 1]×R+. Similarly, for every
t < T and x ∈ [0, 1], it can be shown that (see, e.g., [JYC09, Exercise 3.1.6.7])
νt([0, x]) = P(L ≤ x|Ft) = E
[
f(x,W ∗T )|Ft
]
=
√
2
pi(T − t)
(
f(x,W ∗t )
∫ W ∗t −Wt
0
e
− z2
2(T−t) dz +
∫ +∞
W ∗t
f(x, z) e
− (z−Wt)2
2(T−t) dz
)
.
For z ∈ R+, let us define the function g(·, z) : [0, 1]→ R+ by g(x, z) := (1 + z)1[a(z),b(z)](x), for all
x ∈ [0, 1]. The Ft-conditional density qxt can then be expressed as
qxt =
√
T
T − t
g(x,W ∗t )
∫W ∗t −Wt
0 e
− z2
2(T−t) dz +
∫ +∞
W ∗t
g(x, z)e
− (z−Wt)2
2(T−t) dz∫ +∞
0 g(x, z) e
− z2
2T dz
, for all x ∈ [0, 1],
for every t ∈ [0, T ) and, for t = T ,
qxT =
√
piT
2
g(x,W ∗T )∫ +∞
0 g(x, z)e
− z2
2T dz
, for all x ∈ [0, 1].
The densities qx can be computed more explicitly by introducing the function γ : [0, 1]\{1/2} → R+
given by γ(x) := 2x/(1 − 2x) for x ∈ [0, 1/2) and γ(x) := (2 − 2x)/(2x − 1) for x ∈ (1/2, 1]. Note
that g(x, z) = (1+ z)1[0,γ(x)](z), for all x 6= 1/2. With this notation, for all t ∈ [0, T ), it holds that
qxt = 1{W ∗t ≤γ(x)}
 (1 +W ∗t )
√
2pi
(
Φ
(
W ∗t −Wt√
T−t
)
− 12
)
√
2pi
(
Φ
(
γ(x)√
T
)
− 12
)
+
√
T
(
1− e− γ(x)
2
2T
)
+
(1 +Wt)
√
2pi
(
Φ
(
γ(x)−Wt√
T−t
)
− Φ
(
W ∗t −Wt√
T−t
))
+
√
T − t
(
e
− (W
∗
t −Wt)
2
2(T−t) − e−
(γ(x)−Wt)
2
2(T−t)
)
√
2pi
(
Φ
(
γ(x)√
T
)
− 12
)
+
√
T
(
1− e− γ(x)
2
2T
)
 ,
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for all x 6= 1/2, while for x = 1/2
qxt =
√
2pi
(
(W ∗t −Wt)Φ
(
W ∗t −Wt√
T−t
)
+ 12 +Wt −
W ∗t
2
)
+
√
T − t e−
(W∗t −Wt)
2
2(T−t)√
pi
2 +
√
T
.
At the terminal date t = T , it holds that
qxT = 1{W ∗T≤γ(x)}
1 +W ∗T(
2Φ
(
γ(x)√
T
)
− 1
)
+
√
2T
pi
(
1− e− γ(x)
2
2T
) ,
for all x 6= 1/2, and, for x = 1/2,
qxT =
1 +W ∗T
1 +
√
2T
pi
.
Therefore, we have that
qLT =
1 +W ∗T(
2Φ
(
γ(L)√
T
)
− 1
)
+
√
2T
pi
(
1− e− γ(L)
2
2T
) a.s., with γ(L) = 1 +W ∗T|1− 2U | − 1.
In this example, νt ≪ λ holds a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ], so that Assumption 2 is satisfied. However,
νt and λ fail to be equivalent, for every t ∈ (0, T ]. This simply follows from the observation that
νt is null outside of the interval [a(W
∗
t ), b(W
∗
t )], together with the fact that the process (W
∗
t )t∈[0,T ]
is increasing and the functions a(·) and b(·) are increasing and decreasing, respectively. Moreover,
the continuity of the filtration F implies that Assumption 3 is satisfied. In view of Theorem 2.4,
the insider financial market (Ω,G,P;S) satisfies NUPBR, but arbitrage opportunities do exist.
Note that the observation of the realization L(ω) corresponds to the knowledge that W ∗T (ω) ≥
2L(ω)/(1− 2L(ω)), if L(ω) < 1/2, or that W ∗T (ω) ≤ 2(1−L(ω))/(2L(ω)− 1), if L(ω) > 1/2. This
information represents the informational advantage of an informed agent at time t = 0.
The present example can be generalized to an absolutely continuous random variable U with
arbitrary cumulative distribution function FU and density gU , independent of the Brownian motion
W . Let H : R × R+ → R be a function such that H(u, z) = x if and only if u = h(x, z), for all
(u, z) ∈ R×R+, for some function h : R×R+ → R admitting the partial derivative hx := ∂xh. If we
define the random variable L := H(U,W ∗T ), it can be easily verified that the Ft-conditional densities
of L can be obtained by the same computations as above, replacing f(x, z) with FU (h(x, z)) and
g(x, z) with gU (h(x, z))hx(x, z).
6. Proofs
6.1. Proofs of the results of Section 2. We start by presenting the proofs of the enlargement
of filtration results stated in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The right-continuity ofG follows from [Fon18, Lemma 4.2], while the stability
of the semimartingale property is established in [Jac85, Theorem 1.1]. The existence of the densities
{qx;x ∈ E} can be proven similarly as in [Jac85, Lemma 1.8] and [Ame00, Lemma 2.2] (see [Fon18,
Lemma 2.3] for details). The last part of the lemma follows from [Jac85, Corollary 1.11]. 
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The following implication of Lemma 2.2 will be constantly used: for every t ∈ [0, T ] and (BE⊗Ft)-
measurable function E × Ω ∋ (x, ω) 7→ fxt (ω) ∈ R+, it holds that
(6.1) E
[
fLt
]
= E
[∫
E
fxt q
x
t λ(dx)
]
=
∫
E
E [fxt q
x
t ]λ(dx).
As usual, formula (6.1) can be extended to real-valued integrable (BE ⊗Ft)-measurable functions.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Let us define the Rd+1-valued semimartingale X := (1, S) and note that
ZX ∈ Mloc(P,F). We first prove that ZX has the martingale representation property on (Ω,F,P).
To this effect, let N = (Nt)t∈[0,T ] be a bounded martingale on (Ω,F,P) with N0 = 0 such that
NZX ∈ Mloc(P,F), meaning that NZ ∈ Mloc(P,F) and NZS ∈ Mloc(P,F). Since Q ∼ P, it
holds that N ∈ Mloc(Q,F) and NS ∈Mloc(Q,F). In view of [Jac79, Theorem 11.3], Assumption 1
implies that N is trivial Q-a.s. and, hence, P-a.s. Again by [Jac79, Theorem 11.3], we conclude that
ZX has the martingale representation property on (Ω,F,P). Let M = (Mt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ Mloc(P,G).
By [Fon18, Proposition 4.10], there exists a process H ∈ L(ZX,G) such that
(6.2) Mt =
1
qLt
(
M0 + (H · (ZX))t
)
=
Zt
qLt
M0 + (H · (ZX))t
Zt
a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Furthermore, due to the martingale representation property of S on (Ω,F,Q), there exists a process
θ ∈ L(S,F) such that 1/Z = 1 + θ · S. For each n ∈ N, let us define Hn := H1{‖H‖≤n}. Using
integration by parts and the associativity of the stochastic integral, we have that
M0 +H
n · (ZX)
Z
=M0 +
(
M0 + (H
n · (ZX))−
) · 1
Z
+
Hn
Z−
· (ZX) +Hn ·
[
ZX,
1
Z
]
=M0 +
((
M0 + (H
n · (ZX))−
)
θ
)
· S +Hn ·X − ((Hn)⊤X−Z−) · 1
Z
=M0 +K
n · S,
where the Rd-valued process Kn = (Knt )t∈[0,T ] is defined by
Kn,it := (M0 + (H
n · (ZX))t− − (Hn)⊤t Xt−Zt−)θit +Hn,i+1t ,
for all i = 1, . . . , d and t ∈ [0, T ]. Arguing similarly as in [RS97, Proposition 8], the fact that
H ∈ L(ZX,G) implies that Hn · (ZX) converges to H · (ZX) in the semimartingale topology as
n → +∞. Hence, in view of [JS03, Proposition III.6.26], Kn · S = (M0 + Hn · (ZX))/Z −M0
also converges in the semimartingale topology to K · S, for some K ∈ L(S,G), thus proving that
(M0 +H · (ZX))/Z =M0 +K · S. Together with (6.2), this completes the proof. 
We now prove our main result on the (no-)arbitrage properties of the insider financial market
(Ω,G,P;S) (Theorem 2.4). As a preliminary, we recall the following result on the behavior of
F-local martingales under an initial filtration enlargement. Under the standing Assumptions 2-3,
this is a direct consequence of [ACJ15, Proposition 9] (see also [AFK16, Proposition 3.6]).
Lemma 6.1. Let M = (Mt)t∈[0,T ] be a local martingale on (Ω,F,P). Then M/qL ∈ Mloc(P,G).
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Proof of Theorem 2.4. The sufficiency part of the first assertion of the theorem follows directly
from [AFK16, Theorem 1.12]. In order to prove the necessity, let use define the F-stopping times
ζx := inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : qxt = 0} and ηx := ζx1{qxζx−>0} + (+∞)1{qxζx−=0}, for x ∈ E,
and suppose that there exists a set B ∈ BE with λ(B) > 0 such that P(ηx < +∞) > 0, for all
x ∈ B. By [Jac85, Corollary 1.11], it holds that ηL = ζL = +∞ a.s. For each x ∈ B, define the
F-martingale Mx = (Mxt )t∈[0,T ] byMx := −(1[ηx,T ] − (1[ηx,T ])p), where (1[ηx,T ])p denotes the dual
F-predictable projection of the process 1[ηx,T ] . Since L
1(Ω,FT ,P) is separable, [SY78, Proposition
4] ensures the existence of a (P(F) ⊗ BE)-measurable version of (1[ηx,T ])p. As a consequence of
Assumption 1 together with [Fon18, Proposition 4.9], there exists a (P(F)⊗BE)-measurable process
Hx ∈ L(S,F) such that Mx = Hx · S, for every x ∈ E. The same arguments used in the proof
of [Fon18, Proposition 4.10] allow to show that the G-predictable process HL belongs to L(S,G)
and it holds that HL · S = ML = (1[ηx,T ])p
∣∣
x=L
. The process (1[ηx,T ])
p
∣∣
x=L
is non-negative,
non-decreasing and it holds that
E
[
(1[ηx,T ])
p
T
∣∣
x=L
]
=
∫
E
E
[
qxT (1[ηx,T ])
p
T
]
λ(dx) =
∫
E
E
[∫ T
0
qxu− d(1[ηx,T ])
p
u
]
λ(dx)
=
∫
E
E
[
qxηx−1{ηx≤T}
]
λ(dx) > 0,
where the second and third equalities follow from [HWY92, Theorems 5.32-5.33]. This contradicts
the validity of NUPBR on (Ω,G,P), thus proving the first assertion of the theorem.
Under the assumption that NUPBR holds on (Ω,G,P), let us prove that Z = {Z/qL}. Since
S ∈ Mloc(Q,F) and Z is the density process of Q with respect to P on F, the processes Z and ZS
are local martingales on (Ω,F,P). Hence, Lemma 6.1 implies that Z/qL ∈ Mloc(P,G) and ZS/qL ∈
Mloc(P,G), meaning that Z/qL ∈ Z. In order to prove that Z = {Z/qL}, let D = (Dt)t∈[0,T ] be an
arbitrary element of Z and (τn)n∈N a sequence of G-stopping times increasing a.s. to infinity such
that (Z/qL)τn ∈ M(P,G) and Dτn ∈ M(P,G), for all n ∈ N. For each n ∈ N, define the filtration
Gn = (Gt∧τn)t∈[0,T ] and the probability measures QG,n and Q̂n by dQG,n = ZT∧τn/qLT∧τn dP and
dQ̂n = DT∧τn dP, respectively. It holds that Sτn ∈ Mloc(QG,n,Gn) ∩Mloc(Q̂n,Gn). Let N =
(Nt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ M(QG,n,Gn), so that N(Z/qL)τn ∈ M(P,Gn). By Proposition 2.3 and [HWY92,
Lemma 13.8], it holds that N = N0+ γ · Sτn , for some γ ∈ L(Sτn ,Gn). It follows that Sτn has the
martingale representation property on (Ω,Gn,QG,n). In view of [Jac79, Corollary 11.4] (extended
to a non-trivial initial sigma-field), this implies that QG,n = Q̂n, for every n ∈ N, equivalently
Zt∧τn/qLt∧τn = Dt∧τn a.s., for every t ∈ [0, T ] and n ∈ N. Since the stopping times (τn)n∈N increase
a.s. to infinity, we obtain Z/qL = D up to an evanescent set, thus proving that Z = {Z/qL}.
Let us now prove the second part of the theorem:
(ii) ⇔ (iii): This implication is evident (compare with [Ame00, Lemma 2.2]).
(iii) ⇔ (iv): It suffices to note that, as a consequence of Lemma 2.2 and formula (6.1),
E
[
1
qLT
]
= E
[
1
qLT
1{qL
T
>0}
]
=
∫
E
P(qxT > 0)λ(dx).
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(iii) ⇔ (v): Similarly as above, it holds that
E
[
ZT
qLT
]
= E
[
ZT
qLT
1{qL
T
>0}
]
=
∫
E
E[ZT1{qx
T
>0}]λ(dx) =
∫
E
Q(qxT > 0)λ(dx).
Since Q ∼ P, property (iii) is equivalent to Q(qxT > 0) = 1 for λ-a.e. x ∈ E, thus proving the claim.
(iv)⇔ (vi): Lemma 6.1 implies that 1/qL ∈ Mloc(P,G). Being a strictly positive local martingale,
and therefore a supermartingale, 1/qL is a true martingale if and only if E[1/qLT ] = 1.
(iii) ⇒ (vii): Let define the set B := {x ∈ E : P(qxT = 0) > 0}, with λ(B) = 0. Let N ∈ M(P,F)
and take arbitrary 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , an Fs-measurable set As and a bounded BE-measurable function
h : E → R. By relying on formula (6.1), we can compute:
E
[
Nt
qLt
h(L)1As
]
= E
[
Nt
qLt
h(L)1As1{qLt >0}
]
=
∫
E
h(x)E[Nt1As1{qxt >0}]λ(dx)
=
∫
E\B
h(x)E[Nt1As ]λ(dx) =
∫
E\B
h(x)E[Ns1As ]λ(dx)
=
∫
E
h(x)E[Ns1As1{qxs>0}]λ(dx) = E
[
Ns
qLs
h(L)1As
]
.
Since the the sigma-field Gs is generated by random variables of the form h(L)1As , this proves that
N/qL ∈ M(P,G).
(vii) ⇒ (i): We already know that Z/qL ∈ Z. Since Z ∈ M(P,F), property (vii) implies that
Z/qL ∈ M(P,G). Hence, the probability measure QG defined by dQG := ZT /qLT dP is an equiva-
lent local martingale measure for S on (Ω,G,P). By [DS98], S satisfies NFLVR on (Ω,G,P).
(i) ⇒ (v): We argue by contradiction and construct an arbitrage opportunity explicitly. Suppose
that E[ZT /qLT ] 6= 1. Since Z/qL is a supermartingale on (Ω,G,P), it must be that E[ZT /qLT ] < 1.
Define M = (Mt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ M(P,G) by Mt := E[ZT /qLT |Gt], for all t ∈ [0, T ]. By Proposition 2.3,
there exists K ∈ L(S,G) such that Mt = Zt/qLt (M0 + (K · S)t) a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that
(K · S)t = q
L
t
Zt
Mt −M0 ≥ −M0 ≥ −1 a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ],
where the last inequality follows from the G-supermartingale property of Z/qL. Therefore, the
strategy K is 1-admissible, in the sense of [DS94]. Moreover, it holds that (K · S)T = 1−M0 ≥ 0
a.s. and E[M0] < 1 implies that P((K ·S)T > 0) > 0. This shows thatK is an arbitrage opportunity,
thus contradicting the validity of NFLVR in (Ω,G,P). 
6.2. Proofs of the results of Section 3. We first prove Lemmata 3.2 and 3.4, which together
provide a complete duality description of the set of admissible portfolios.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. (i): Let H ∈ {F,G} and (ϑ, c) ∈ AH,k+ (v). For simplicity of notation, let us
denote V := V v+k,ϑ,c, C :=
∫ ·
0 cu dκu and C˜ :=
∫ ·
0 Z
H
u dCu. By the integration by parts formula
(see, e.g., [JS03, Proposition I.4.49]), we have that, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ZHt Vt + C˜t = Z
H
t
(
v + k + (ϑ · S)t
)− ZHt Ct + ∫ t
0
ZHu dCu = Z
H
t
(
v + k + (ϑ · S)t
)− (C− · ZH)t.
Since ZH ∈ Mloc(P,H) and ZHS ∈ Mloc(P,H), this implies that ZHV + C˜ is a sigma-martingale
on (Ω,H,P) (see, e.g., [Fon15, Lemma 4.2]). Being non-negative, it is also a supermartingale
THE VALUE OF INFORMATIONAL ARBITRAGE 27
(see [Kal04, Proposition 3.1]). In order to show that (ϑ, c) ∈ AH,ksm (v), it remains to prove that
C˜T ∈ L1(P). Arguing similarly as in [CCFM17, Lemma 1], let (τn)n∈N be a localizing sequence of
H-stopping times for C− · ZH ∈ Mloc(P,H). Then, for every n ∈ N, it holds that
v+k ≥ E [ZHT∧τn(v + k + (ϑ · S)T∧τn)] ≥ E[ZHT∧τnCT∧τn] = E [∫ T∧τn
0
Cu− dZHu +
∫ T∧τn
0
ZHu dCu
]
,
where we have used the supermartingale property of ZH(v + k + ϑ · S) and integration by parts.
Since (C− · ZH)τn ∈ M(P,H), for all n ∈ N, the monotone convergence theorem yields that
v + k ≥ lim
n→+∞E
[
C˜T∧τn
]
= E
[
C˜T
]
.
Conversely, let (ϑ, c) ∈ AH,ksm (v). By definition, the process ZHV v+k,ϑ,c +
∫ ·
0 Z
H
u cu dκu is a super-
martingale on (Ω,H,P). Therefore, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ZHt V
v+k,ϑ,c
t +
∫ t
0
ZHu cu dκu ≥ E
[
ZHT V
v+k,ϑ,c
T +
∫ T
0
ZHu cu dκu
∣∣∣∣Ht] ≥ E [∫ T
0
ZHu cu dκu
∣∣∣∣Ht] ,
so that ZHt V
v+k,ϑ,c
t ≥ E[
∫ T
t Z
H
u cu dκu|Ht] ≥ 0. This shows that V v,ϑ,ct ≥ −k a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ],
thus proving that (ϑ, c) ∈ AH,k+ (v).
(ii): Lemma 2.2 together with [Jeu80, Proposition 2.1] implies that L(S,F) ⊆ L(S,G), from which
the inclusion AF,k+ (v) ⊆ AG,k+ (v) immediately follows. In turn, in view of part (i) of the lemma,
this implies that AF,ksm (v) ⊆ AG,ksm (v).
Let us now turn to the proof of the last assertion of the lemma. Suppose first that E[1/qLT ] 6= 1,
or, equivalently, E[ZT /qLT ] 6= 1 (see Theorem 2.4). Since Z/qL is a strictly positive local martingale
on (Ω,G,P) (see Lemma 6.1), it must be that E[ZT /qLT ] < 1 and Z/q
L /∈M(P,G) (i.e., Z/qL is a
strict local martingale). Consider the pair (0, 0) ∈ AF,km (1), generating the constant value process
V 1,0,0 = 1. Since ZGV 1,0,0 = Z/qL /∈ M(P,G), this suffices to show that (0, 0) /∈ AG,km (1), thus
proving that AF,km (1) * AG,km (1). Conversely, suppose that E[1/qLT ] = 1 and let (ϑ, c) ∈ AF,km (v).
Let us denote V := V v+k,ϑ,c and C˜ :=
∫ ·
0 Z
F
u cu dκu and note that
E
[
C˜T
qLT
]
= E
[
C˜T
qLT
1{qL
T
>0}
]
=
∫
E
E
[
C˜T1{qx
T
>0}
]
λ(dx) = E
[
C˜T
]
< +∞,
where we have used formula (6.1) and the equivalence (iii)⇔(iv) of Theorem 2.4. Again by Theorem
2.4, it holds that 1/qL ∈ M(P,G). Therefore, taking the G-optional projection of 1/qLT (see, e.g.,
[HWY92, Theorem 5.16]), we can write, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
E
[
C˜T
qLT
∣∣∣∣Gt
]
= E
[∫ T
t
1
qLT
dC˜u +
C˜t
qLT
∣∣∣∣Gt
]
= E
[∫ T
t
1
qLu
dC˜u
∣∣∣∣Gt]+ C˜tqLt
= E
[∫ T
0
1
qLu
dC˜u
∣∣∣∣Gt]− ∫ t
0
1
qLu
dC˜u +
C˜t
qLt
,
thus showing that C˜/qL−∫ ·0(1/qLu ) dC˜u ∈ M(P,G). Since (ϑ, c) ∈ AF,km (v), it holds that ZFV +C˜ ∈
M(P,F). By Theorem 2.4, the fact that E[1/qLT ] = 1 then implies that (ZFV + C˜)/qL ∈ M(P,G).
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By the integration by parts formula, we have that
ZGt Vt +
∫ t
0
ZGu dCu =
ZFt Vt
qLt
+
∫ t
0
1
qLu
dC˜u =
ZFt Vt + C˜t
qLt
− C˜t
qLt
+
∫ t
0
1
qLu
dC˜u,
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This proves that ZGV + ∫ ·0 ZGu cu dκu ∈ M(P,G), so that (ϑ, c) ∈ AG,km (v). 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. The fact that CH,k+ (v) = CH,ksm (v) is a direct consequence of part (i) of Lemma
3.2. If c ∈ CH,k+ (v), then there exists ϑ ∈ L(S,H) such that (ϑ, c) ∈ AH,k+ (v) = AH,ksm (v) (see Lemma
3.2). Therefore, due to the supermartingale property of the process ZHV v+k,ϑ,c+
∫ ·
0 Z
H
u cu dκu and
to the fact that V v,ϑ,cT ≥ 0 a.s., it holds that
v + k ≥ E
[
ZHT V
v+k,ϑ,c
T +
∫ T
0
ZHu cu dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] ≥ E [kZHT + ∫ T
0
ZHu cu dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] ,
so that E[
∫ T
0 Z
H
u cu dκu|H0] ≤ v+ k(1−E[ZHT |H0]) a.s. Conversely, let C :=
∫ ·
0 cu dκu and suppose
that E[
∫ T
0 Z
H
u dCu|H0] ≤ v + k(1− E[ZHT |H0]) a.s. Consider the process V̂ = (V̂t)t∈[0,T ] defined by
V̂t := v + Z
H
t Ct −
∫ t
0
ZHu dCu + E
[ ∫ T
0
ZHu dCu
∣∣∣∣Ht]− E[∫ T
0
ZHu dCu
∣∣∣∣H0]
+ k
(
1− E[ZHT |H0] + E[ZHT |Ht]− ZHt
)
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The process V̂ is well-defined as an element of Mloc(P,H). As a consequence of
Assumption 1 (and of Proposition 2.3, in the case H = G), there exists ψ ∈ L(S,H) such that
V̂t = Z
H
t
(
v + (ψ · S)t
)
a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
The process V v+k,ψ,c = (V v+k,ψ,ct )t∈[0,T ] associated to the pair (ψ, c) satisfies
ZHt V
v+k,ψ,c
t +
∫ t
0
ZHu dCu = v + k + E
[ ∫ T
0
ZHu dCu
∣∣∣∣Ht]− E[ ∫ T
0
ZHu dCu
∣∣∣∣H0]
+ k
(
E[ZHT |Ht]− E[ZHT |H0]
)
a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
By construction, it holds that ZHT V
v,ψ,c
T ≥ 0 a.s. This shows that (ψ, c) ∈ AH,km (v) ⊆ AH,k+ (v) (see
Lemma 3.2), thus proving that c ∈ CH,k+ (v). Assertion (ii) follows by analogous arguments, using
the definition of the set CH,km (v) and replacing the supermartingale property with the martingale
property. It remains to prove (3.3). Since AH,km (v) ⊆ AH,k+ (v), it is clear that uH,k(v) ≥ uH,km (v).
In order to prove the converse inequality, let c ∈ CH,k+ (v). By part (i) of the lemma, it holds that
E[
∫ T
0 Z
H
u cu dκu|H0] ≤ v+k(1−E[ZHT |H0]) a.s. Let define the H0-measurable non-negative random
variable v˜ := v + k(1− E[ZHT |H0])− E[
∫ T
0 Z
H
u cu dκu|H0] and define c˜ = (c˜t)t∈[0,T ] ∈ O+(H) by
c˜t := ct +
v˜
ZHt E[κT |H0]
, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
By construction, it holds that E[
∫ T
0 Z
H
u c˜u dκu|H0] = v+ k(1−E[ZHT |H0]) a.s., so that c˜ ∈ CH,km (v).
Moreover, for every t ∈ [0, T ], we have that P(c˜t ≥ ct) = 1, with P(c˜t > ct) > 0 if and only if
c /∈ CH,km (v). Since U is assumed to be strictly increasing (Assumption 3.3), this implies that
E
[∫ T
0
U(u, cu) dκu
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
U(u, c˜u) dκu
]
,
THE VALUE OF INFORMATIONAL ARBITRAGE 29
with strict inequality holding if and only if c /∈ CHm (v). By the arbitrariness of c ∈ CH,k+ (v), we then
have uH,k(v) ≤ uH,km (v), thus proving equality (3.3). 
We are now in a position to prove Proposition 3.6. Even though the proof follows a well-known
scheme, we give full details for the convenience of the reader.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Under the present assumptions, the process cH = (cHt )t∈[0,T ] satisfies
E[
∫ T
0 Z
H
u c
H
u dκu|H0] = v+ k(1−E[ZH|H0]) a.s., so that cH ∈ CH,km (v) by Lemma 3.4. Consider an
arbitrary consumption process c ∈ CH,km (v). By the concavity of U (Assumption 3.3), it holds that
U(t, cHt ) ≥ U(t, ct) + U ′(t, cHt )(cHt − ct) = U(t, ct) + ΛH(v)ZHt (cHt − ct), for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Therefore,
E
[∫ T
0
U(u, cHu ) dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] ≥ E [∫ T
0
U(u, cu) dκu
∣∣∣∣H0]
+ ΛH(v)E
[∫ T
0
ZHu c
H
u dκu
∣∣∣∣H0]− ΛH(v)E [∫ T
0
ZHu cu dκu
∣∣∣∣H0]
= E
[∫ T
0
U(u, cu) dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] ,
where the equality follows from the fact that, in view of part (ii) of Lemma 3.4,
v + k
(
1− E[ZHT |H0]
)
= E
[∫ T
0
ZHu c
H
u dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] = E [∫ T
0
ZHu cu dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] a.s.
The claim follows by the arbitrariness of c ∈ CH,km (v) together with equality (3.3) in Lemma 3.4. 
Proof of Corollary 3.10. In view of Proposition 3.6, in order to compute uH,k(v) it suffices to
find explicitly the H0-measurable random variable ΛH,k(v) satisfying equation (3.4). Note that,
whenever it exists, the random variable ΛH,k(v) is uniquely determined (up to a P-nullset).
(i): If U(ω, t, x) = log(x), then I(ω, t, y) = 1/y, for all (ω, t, y) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× (0,+∞). Therefore,
equation (3.4) can be explicitly solved and it holds that ΛH,k(v) = E[κT |H0]/(v+k(1−E[ZHT |H0])).
By Proposition 3.6, the optimal solution cH = (cHt )t∈[0,T ] is then given by
cHt =
1
ΛH,k(v)ZHt
=
v + k(1− E[ZHT |H0])
ZHt E[κT |H0]
, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Under the integrability assumption stated in the corollary, the optimal expected utility uH,k(v) as
given by (3.5) can be obtained by means of a straightforward computation. Note that the first two
terms on the right-hand side of (3.5) are always finite, as a consequence of the boundedness of κT .
(ii): If U(ω, t, x) = xp/p, then I(ω, t, y) = y1/(p−1), for all (ω, t, y) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] × (0,+∞). By
Proposition 3.6, the H0-measurable random variable ΛH,k(v) must solve
E
[ ∫ T
0
(ZHu )
p
p−1
(
ΛH,k(v)
) 1
p−1 dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] = v + k (1− E[ZHT |H0]) .
Therefore, if E[
∫ T
0 (Z
H
u )
p/(p−1) dκu|H0] < +∞ a.s., then we have that
ΛH,k(v) =
(
v + k(1− E[ZHT |H0])
)p−1
E
[∫ T
0
(ZHu )
p
p−1 dκu
∣∣∣∣H0]1−p .
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By Proposition 3.6, the corresponding optimal consumption process cH = (cHt )t∈[0,T ] is given by
cHt = (Λ
H,k(v)ZHt )
1/(p−1), for all t ∈ [0, T ]. If E[∫ T0 (ZHu )p/(p−1) dκu|H0]1−p ∈ L1(P), then the
optimal expected utility uH,k(v) is finite and can be explicitly computed as in (3.6). 
Proof of Corollary 3.12. We first show that equation (3.9) admits an a.s. unique solution, for every
v > vHk . To this effect, we define the H0-measurable function g : Ω× (0,+∞)→ R+ by
g(λ) :=
1
α
E
[∫ T
0
ZHu
(
log
(
α
λZHu
))+
dκu
∣∣∣∣H0
]
, for λ ∈ (0,+∞).
Note that g is well-defined, since
g(λ) =
1
α
E
[∫ T
0
ZHu log
(
α
λZHu
)
1{ZHu ≤α/λ} dκu
∣∣∣∣H0] ≤ E[κT |H0]λ < +∞ a.s.
Clearly, g is a decreasing function. Furthermore, the dominated convergence theorem implies that
g is continuous. Again by dominated convergence, it holds that limλ→+∞ g(λ) = 0 a.s. and a
straightforward application of Fatou’s lemma yields that limλ↓0 g(λ) = +∞ a.s. Moreover, for all
0 < λ′ < λ < +∞, it holds that g(λ′) > g(λ) a.s. on {g(λ) > 0}. Indeed, arguing by contradiction,
if the H0-measurable set Gλ,λ′ := {g(λ) = g(λ′), g(λ) > 0} has strictly positive probability, then
E
[∫ T
0
ZHu
((
log
(
α
λ′ZHu
))+
−
(
log
(
α
λZHu
))+)
dκu
∣∣∣∣H0
]
= 0 on Gλ,λ′ .
However, since log(α/(λ′ZHu )) > log(α/(λZHu )) for all u ∈ [0, T ], this contradicts the assumption
that g(λ) > 0. In view of these observations, v+ k(1−E[ZHT |G0](ω)) ∈ {g(λ)(ω) : λ ∈ (0,+∞)} for
a.a. ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, by [Ben70, Lemma 1], equation (3.9) admits a unique strictly positive H0-
measurable solution ΛH,k(v), for every v > vHk . With some abuse of notation, let U(x) := −e−αx,
for x ∈ R+, and I(y) := (1/α)(log(α/y))+, for y ∈ (0,+∞). It can be easily checked that
(6.3) sup
x∈R+
(
U(x)− xy) = U(I(y)) − yI(y), for all y > 0.
Let us then define the consumption process cH = (cHt )t∈[0,T ] by
cHt :=
1
α
(
log
(
α
ΛH,k(v)ZHt
))+
, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
and note that E[
∫ T
0 Z
H
u c
H
u dκu|H0] = v + k(1− E[ZHT |H0]) a.s., so that cH ∈ CH,km (v). Consider an
arbitrary consumption process c = (ct)t∈[0,T ] ∈ CH,km (v) and note that, as a consequence of (6.3),
U(cHt ) ≥ U(ct) + ΛH(v)ZHt (cHt − ct), for all t ∈ [0, T ].
The same argument adopted in the proof of Proposition 3.6 allows then to conclude that cH is the
optimal consumption process. Formula (3.8) then follows by direct computations. 
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6.3. Proofs of the results of Section 4.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. (i): Due to the concavity of U (see Assumption 3.3), the assumption that
uG,k(v0) < +∞ for some v0 > vGk implies that the function uG,k is concave and uG,k(v) < +∞,
for all v ≥ vGk . By Lemma 3.2, it holds that uG,k(v) ≥ uF,k(v) = uF,0(v) > −∞, for every v > 0.
Therefore, for every v > 0, equation (4.1) admits a unique non-negative solution piU,k(v) if the
function uG,k is continuous, strictly increasing and satisfies limwցvG
k
uG,k(w) < uF,0(v). Under
the present assumptions, uG,k satisfies these properties. Indeed, by concavity, the function uG,k is
continuous on (vGk ,+∞). Moreover, by condition (3.4), we have that, for every v > vGk and δ > 0,
E
[∫ T
0
ZGu
(
I
(
u,ΛG,k(v + δ)ZGu
)− I(u,ΛG,k(v)ZGu ))dκu ∣∣∣∣G0] = δ,
for some G0-measurable random variables ΛG,k(v + δ) and ΛG,k(v). Since ZG > 0 and I(ω, t, ·)
is strictly decreasing, for every (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ], this implies that ΛG,k(v + δ) < ΛG,k(v) a.s.
Recalling that uG,k(v) = E[
∫ T
0 U(u, I(u,Λ
G,k(v)ZGu ))dκu], as a consequence of Proposition 3.6,
this implies that uG,k is strictly increasing.
(ii): If E[1/qLT ] < 1, then E[Z
G
T ] < 1 (see Theorem 2.4). As explained in Remark 3.7 (with
H = G), this entails that k 7→ uG,k(v) is strictly increasing. In turn, in view of Definition 4.1, this
implies that k 7→ piU,k(v) is strictly increasing, for every v > 0. Conversely, if the map k 7→ piU,k(v)
is strictly increasing, then it necessarily holds that uG,k(v) > uG,0(v), for every v > vGk . In view
of Remark 3.5 together with Theorem 2.4, this implies that E[1/qLT ] < 1.
(iii): It suffices to show that, if
∫
E(E[
∫ T
0 1{qxt =0}dκt] + kP(q
x
T = 0))λ(dx) > 0 holds, then
uG,k(v) > uF,0(v), for all k ∈ R+ and v > 0. Under the present assumptions and in view of
Lemma 3.4, there exists a pair (ϑF, cF) ∈ AF,0m (v) such that cF solves problem (3.1) (with H = F).
By Lemma 3.2, it holds that (ϑF, cF) ∈ AF,km (v) ⊆ AG,ksm (v), so that
M0 := E
[∫ T
0
ZGu c
F
u dκu + kZ
G
T
∣∣∣∣G0] ≤ v + k a.s.
By formula (6.1), the G0-measurable random variable M0 can be computed explicitly. Indeed, let
h : E → R be an arbitrary BE-measurable bounded function. Then
E
[
h(L)
(∫ T
0
ZGu c
F
u dκu + kZ
G
T
)]
=
∫
E
h(x)E
[
qxT
∫ T
0
ZFu
qxu
1{qxu>0}c
F
u dκu + kZ
F
T 1{qxT>0}
]
λ(dx)
=
∫
E
h(x)E
[∫ T
0
ZFu 1{qxu>0}c
F
u dκu + kZ
F
T 1{qxT>0}
]
λ(dx),
where the second equality follows from [HWY92, Theorem 5.32]. We have thus shown that M0 =
E[
∫ T
0 Z
F
u 1{qxu>0}c
F
u dκu+kZ
F
T 1{qxT>0}]
∣∣
x=L
a.s. Since the process cF is strictly positive (dκ⊗P)-a.e.
(as a consequence of Assumption 3.3), the condition
∫
E(E[
∫ T
0 1{qxt =0}dκt] + kP(q
x
T = 0))λ(dx) > 0
implies that P(M0 < v + k) > 0. Define then an O(G)-measurable process cˆ = (cˆt)t∈[0,T ] by
cˆt := c
F
t +
v + k −M0
ZGt E[κT |G0]
, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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Similarly as in the last part of the proof of Lemma 3.4, it holds that cˆ ∈ CG,km (v). Furthermore,
since P(cˆt > cFt ) > 0 for every t ∈ [0, T ], we have that
uG,k(v) ≥ E
[∫ T
0
U(u, cˆu) dκu
]
> E
[∫ T
0
U(u, cFu ) dκu
]
= uF,k(v),
thus completing the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. The result follows from the explicit expressions for the optimal expected
utilities obtained in Corollary 3.10. More specifically, in view of equation (3.5), part (i) follows by
solving with respect to pilog(v) the equation
0 = uF(v)− uG(v − pilog(v))
= log(v)E[κT ]− log
(
E[κT ]
)
E[κT ] + E
[∫ T
0
log
(
1
Zu
)
dκu
]
− log(v − pilog(v))E[κT ] + E[log(E[κT |G0])κT ]− E [∫ T
0
log
(
qLu
Zu
)
dκu
]
.
Similarly, in view of equation (3.6), part (ii) of the theorem follows by solving the equation
0 = uF(v)− uG(v − pipwr(v))
=
vp
p
E
[∫ T
0
(Zu)
p
p−1 dκu
]1−p
−
(
v − pipwr(v))p
p
E
[
E
[∫ T
0
(
Zu/q
L
u
) p
p−1 dκu
∣∣∣∣G0]1−p
]
.

Proof of Theorem 4.5. Note first that, since U is concave, Jensen’s inequality and the assumption
that S ∈ Mloc(P,F) imply that uF,k(v) = U(v), for every utility function U ∈ U and (k, v) ∈ R2+.
(i)⇒(ii): Let U be an arbitrary element of U , k ∈ R+ and v > 0. Consider the consumption process
cG = (cGt )t∈[0,T ] given by cGt = v1{t=T}, for t ∈ [0, T ]. Since dκu = δT (du) and P(qLT = q) = 1,
with q ≥ 1, Lemma 3.4 implies that cG ∈ CG,km ((v + k)/q − k). As a consequence, we have that
uG,k((v + k)/q − k) ≥ E[U(cGT )] = U(v), for every v > 0.
On the other hand, by Jensen’s inequality, for any consumption process c ∈ CG,k+ ((v+ k)/q− k), it
holds that
E
[
U(cT )
] ≤ U(E[cT ]) = U (q E [cT /qLT ]) ≤ U(q((v + k)/q − k + k − k/q)) = U(v),
where the second inequality follows from part (i) of Lemma 3.4, since Q = P and dκu = δT (du).
We have thus shown that uG,k((v + k)/q − k) = U(v) = uF,k(v), for every U ∈ U , thus proving
that (ii) holds, with the indifference value pik(v) being given as in (4.4).
(ii)⇒(iii): This implication trivially follows by taking k = 0 in (ii).
(iii)⇒(i): Consider the utility functions U1(x) = log(x) and U2(x) = xp/p, for p ∈ (0, 1). For
H ∈ {F,G} and i ∈ {1, 2}, denote by uH,0i (v) the value function of the corresponding expected
utility maximization problem (3.1), for v > 0 and k = 0. Suppose that, for every v > 0, there
exists a value pi0(v) such that uG,0i (v−pi0(v)) = uF,0i (v) = Ui(v), for i ∈ {1, 2} and all p ∈ (0, 1). In
particular, this implies that uG,0i (v − pi0(v)) < +∞, for i ∈ {1, 2}, and pi0(v) = pilog(v) = pipwr(v),
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for all p ∈ (0, 1), using the notation introduced in Proposition 4.3. The assumptions of Proposition
4.3 are therefore satisfied and, in view of formulae (4.2)-(4.3), it holds that
exp
(
E
[
log(qLT )
])
= E
[
E
[
(qLT )
p
1−p
∣∣∣G0]1−p]1/p ,
for all p ∈ (0, 1). By Jensen’s inequality, it holds that exp(E[log(qLT )]) ≤ E[qLT ]. On the other hand,
the function x 7→ x1/(1−p) is convex and, again by Jensen’s inequality,
E
[
E
[
(qLT )
p
1−p
∣∣∣σ(L)]1−p]1/p ≥ E[E [(qLT )p∣∣G0]]1/p = E [(qLT )p]1/p .
We have thus shown that
E
[
(qLT )
p
]1/p ≤ E [E [(qLT ) p1−p ∣∣∣G0]1−p]1/p ≤ E[qLT ]
and E[(qLT )
p]1/p < +∞, for all p ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, E[E[(qLT )
p
1−p |σ(L)]1−p]1/p converges to E[qLT ] as
p→ 1. In turn, this implies that
v
(
1− e−E[log(qLT )]
)
= pilog(v) = pipwr(v) = v
(
1− E
[
E
[
(qLT )
p
1−p
∣∣∣G0]1−p]−1/p
)
→ v
(
1− 1
E[qLT ]
)
as p→ 1. As a consequence, it holds that E[log(qLT )] = log(E[qLT ]). Since the function x 7→ log(x) is
strictly concave, this implies that there exists a strictly positive constant q such that P(qLT = q) = 1.
The fact that q ≥ 1 follows since E[1/qLT ] ≤ 1, by the supermartingale property of 1/qL on (Ω,G,P).
It remains to show that, under conditions (i), (ii), or (iii), the optimal wealth process in problem
(3.1) for H = G, denoted by V G = (V Gt )t∈[0,T ], is given as in (4.5). The optimal consumption
plan cG constructed in the first part of the proof belongs to CG,km ((v + k)/q − k). Therefore,
v
q
= E
[
cGT
qLT
∣∣∣∣Gt] = V Gt + kqLt − E
[
k
qLT
∣∣∣∣Gt] = V Gt + kqLt − kq a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ],
where the second equality follows from the definition of the set CG,km ((v + k)/q − k). 
Proof of Proposition 4.8. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4.5, it holds that uF,k(v) = U(v),
for every U ∈ U , k ∈ R+ and v ≥ 0. The consumption process cG = (cGt )t∈[0,T ] defined by cGt =
v1{t=T}, for t ∈ [0, T ], belongs to CG,k+ ((v+ k)/qmin− k). Indeed, under the present assumptions it
holds that E[(v + k)/qLT |G0] ≤ (v + k)/qmin a.s. Therefore, for all k ∈ R+ and v > 0, we have that
uF,k(v) = U(v) = E[U(cGT )] ≤ uG,k((v + k)/qmin − k),
which implies that v − piU,k(v) ≤ (v + k)/qmin − k, thus proving the first inequality in (4.6).
Consider then an arbitrary consumption process c = (ct)t∈[0,T ] ∈ CG,k+ ((v + k)/qmax − k). By
Jensen’s inequality, it holds that
E[U(cT )] ≤ U(E[cT ]) ≤ U
(
qmax E
[
cT
qLT
])
≤ U(v) = uF,k(v),
where the third inequality follows from Lemma 3.4. By the arbitrariness of c, this implies that
uG,k((v + k)/qmax − k) ≤ uF,k(v), thus showing that v − piU,k(v) ≥ (v + k)/qmax − k. 
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7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a general study of the value of informational arbitrage, in
the context of a semimartingale model of a complete financial market with inside information. In
our analysis, the assumption of market completeness plays a central role. In particular, it can be
naturally transferred to the initially enlarged filtration G, thus enabling us to obtain a precise
characterization of the validity of NUPBR and NFLVR in the insider financial market (Ω,G,P;S).
In turn, this provides a general and simple duality approach to the solution of optimal consumption-
investment problems. In the case of typical utility functions, market completeness leads to fully
explicit solutions, which reveal interesting features of the value of informational arbitrage.
The value of informational arbitrage can also be defined and studied in general incomplete
markets. In particular, the existence and uniqueness result of Theorem 4.2 still holds in incomplete
markets, as long as the optimal investment-consumption problem inG is well-posed. More precisely,
if the primal and dual value functions in G are finite and (Ω,G,P;S) satisfies NUPBR (but not
necessarily NFLVR), then the results of [CCFM17] imply that the value function is sufficiently
regular to prove the existence and uniqueness of the value of informational arbitrage. However,
except for specific models, one cannot obtain an explicit description of the value of informational
arbitrage. Furthermore, in general incomplete markets, there does not exist a simple criterion for
determining whether the inside information generates arbitrage in G (compare with Theorem 2.4).
In the present work, we have considered a frictionless financial market where the traded assets
are infinitely liquid. In our view, an interesting direction of future research consists in studying the
value of informational arbitrage under more realistic market structures featuring transaction costs
as well as price impact, in the spirit of [KHS06]. In those cases, it may be optimal for an informed
agent to underinvest in the arbitrage opportunity, because the trading activity itself can affect the
profitability of arbitrage strategies or simply because of the presence of market frictions.
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